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CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL WATER POLLUTION:
COLOR THE PROBLEM GREEN
N. WILLIAM HINES*
I. INTRODUCTION
The green color alluded to in the title is not a reference to the
nauseous cast imparted to thousands of miles of waterways by acids
draining from nearby mining operations; nor to the dazzling array of
unnatural water colorations produced by the effluents from chemical
and textile industries; nor to the characteristic hue of the algal growths
and other noxious water plants currently strangling our rivers and fill-
ing our lakes as the result of the high nutrient content of the waste
loads they receive. Each of these references would have been accurate
and relevant; however, the allusion intended was to money.
While it is undoubtedly true that most of the nation's social ills
could be greatly ameliorated by the wise expenditure of enough money,
it is submitted that environmental pollution is unique in the extent to
which the relevant value conflicts may be translated into fiscal alterna-
tives. The one proposition upon which there seems nearly unanimous
agreement among environmental quality experts is that economic
factors have been and continue to be the principal deterrent to cleaning
up the pollution that threatens to engulf us. No disabling void in
scientific knowledge nor critical gap in engineering technology bars the
realization of our environmental quality goals.' To be sure, perfection
is not the state of the art in scientific waste management but, to date,
a gross deficiency of investment in available waste treatment measures
has singularly frustrated abatement of environmental pollution.
Americans have been polluting their physical environment for a
long time, but only in the last decade has the flood of pollutants at-
tracted sufficient public concern to create meaningful pressures on many
fronts to halt the despoiling of our air, land and water resources.2 The
direct remedy for nearly all of our environmental pollution problems
* BA., Baker University, 1958; LL B, University of Kansas, 1961; Member,
Kansas and Iowa Bars; Professor, University of Iowa Law School.
1 See Report on Environmental Pollution by the Subcomm. on Science, Research and
Development of the House Comm. on Science and Astronautics, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966).
2 One evidence of the climate of public opinion is the avalanche of nontechnical
books and articles devoted to pollution that have appeared in the last few years. See,
e.g., P. Briggs, Water the Vital Essence (1967) ; D. Carr, Death of the Sweet Waters
(1966) ; F. Graham, Disaster by Default, Politics and Water Pollution (1966) ; L.
Herber, Crises in Our Cities (1965) ; League of Women Voters, Education Fund, The
Big Water Fight (1960) ; P. Rodale, Our Poisoned Earth and Sky (1964) ; J. Wright,
The Coming Water Famine (1966) ; Dugan, Nor Any Drop to Drink, Playboy, Sept.
1966, at 150; The Crisis in Water, 48 Saturday Review 23-44, 76-80 (Oct. 23, 1965).
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lies in the creation and application of procedures to capture and
cleanse the innumerable wastes generated by our modern industrial
civilization. The aggregate cost of effecting a substantial restoration in
environmental quality is monumental.'
Because our water resources have suffered the most severe de-
terioration in quality, water pollution abatement carries the highest
price tag. Estimates of the total cost of eliminating the backlog in
waste treatment facilities while keeping pace with the torrent of wastes
produced by our burgeoning population and our expanding industries
run as high as 110 billion dollars over the next three decades.' The
share of this projected cost attributable to industrial waste treatment is
probably greater than 50 percent.'
This article will explore the nation's water pollution problem as
it relates to industrial waste disposal. Two basic issues pervade the dis-
cussion: What cost is reasonable and how should the cost burden be
distributed? In addressing these issues, first, a brief examination will
be made of the facts of industrial water pollution. Second, specific
pollution problems created by major industrial water users will be
considered. Next, the existence of a national water quality policy will
be explored, and finally an analysis will be made of various methods for
generating investment necessary to implement the policy.
II. THE FACTS OF INDUSTRIAL WATER POLLUTION
Before discussing the alternatives for generating the needed in-
vestment in industrial waste treatment, two aspects of the pollution
problem must be noted. First, the case should be made that such a
need truly exists. Second, the reasons why industry has done an in-
adequate job of waste treatment should be considered.
As to the first aspect, great skills of advocacy are hardly required.
Barring significant breakthroughs in weather modification or desaliniza-
3 See generally Nat'l Acad. of Sci., Nat'l Research Council, Waste Management and
Control, Pub. No. 1400 (1966); Report of the Environmental Pollution Panel, President's
Science Advisory Comm., Restoring the Quality of Our Environment (1965).
4 Hanks & Kube, Industry Action to Combat Pollution, 44 Harv. Bus. Rev. 49, 57-59
(Sept.-Oct. 1966). The figure frequently suggested by Sen. Muskie is 100 billion dollars
by the year 2000. Hearings on S. 2947 (and related bills) Before the Subcomm. on Air
and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 23
(1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Senate Hearings]. Most recent cost estimates on the
short-term cost place the required investments between 1969 and 1973 at over 26 billion
dollars. U.S. Department of the Interior, Federal Water Pollution Control Administration,
The Cost of Clean Water, Vol. I, Summary Report 3-4 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Costs].
Short-term cost estimates are found in S. Rep.' No. 1367, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12
(1966).
5 Estimates of needed industrial investment are sketchy because only a small segment
of industry has begun to meet its pollution control responsibilities. U.S. Department
of the Interior, Program of the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration 5 (July
1967) [hereinafter cited as Program]. Recent estimates of needed industrial investment
for 1967-1973 run as high as 4.6 billion dollars. Costs, supra note 4, at 4.
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tion, by the year 1980 water use in the United States will exceed the
dependable supply of fresh water by 85 billion gallons per day. By
2000 the gap will be 350 billion gallons per day.° Wholesale reuse of
water becomes essential under these circumstances, just as it has been
necessary in many parts of the country for some time. 7 To be reusable,
water must be maintained at quality levels reasonably suitable for the
purposes of the downstream users. On these bare facts, it is not
difficult to understand why water pollution control is the number one
environmental quality problem.
Industry is the largest user of water, currently using around 200
billion gallons of water a day .° By 1980 industrial use is expected to
double. Although industry's quality requirements are not high in
comparison to most other users, badly degraded water is not suitable
for many industrial purposes. Therefore, industry has a substantial
interest in the quality of water entering its intake pipes.
Industry is also the most flagrant abuser of water quality. In-
dustry discharges into the nation's waters organic wastes with a
pollutional strength of at least double the sewage of all municipalities
combined .° In addition, industry effluent contains an untold quantity
of inorganic wastes. Industrial pollution was responsible for 53 percent
of the over nine million fish killed by pollution in 1966. 10 In 1964 only
30 percent of the waste water discharged by industry received any
treatment whatsoever; and much of what was treated passed through
municipal sewage plants." Projections to the year 2000 show a seven-
fold increase in the wastes of water-using industries."
Industrial wastes impair water quality in diverse ways. Wastes
may contain bacteria or viruses harmful to human health. Besides
obvious aesthetic considerations, the decomposition of organic wastes
robs water of dissolved oxygen essential to support the life processes
of aquatic creatures. Salts, acids, phenols, alkalies and other com-
pounds present in industrial waste waters degrade water for a wide
range of uses, while the various organic or inorganic chemicals industry
discharges into water disrupt the delicate food chains of lower levels
6 Engineering estimates place the maximum amount of fresh water that can be used
in the continental United States at 650 billion gallons per day. In 1960 the maximum
available supply was 315 billion gallons per day. By 1980 engineering works may increase
this to 515 billion gallons. See Staff Report to the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., A Study of Pollution—Water 1-7 (Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter cited
as Staff Report].
7 One frequently quoted statistic on reuse is that water in the Ohio River is used
3.7 times before it enters the Mississippi River. See id. at 6, 8.
8 In 1964, 8925 industries accounted for 97% of the nation's industrial water use of
170 billion gallons per day. Program, supra note 5, at 2, 4.
9 Industrial Water Pollution Control, in Mill and Factory 58 (Nov. 1966).
79 2 CCH Water Control News, No. 24, at 6-7 (Oct. 30, 1967).
77 Program, supra note 5, at 2.
72 Nat'l Acad. of Sci., supra note 3, at 12.
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of animal and vegetable life and ultimately may prove toxic to people.
At the opposite extreme, chemical nutrients stimulate the growth of
nuisance aquatic vegetation, and hasten the natural aging processes of
lakes. Dissolved and suspended inert solids affect the turbidity of
water and may congest the watercourse as they precipitate. Heat added
to water in industrial cooling processes may alter the physical char-
acteristics of the water in a manner similar to an organic waste load.
Finally, the escape of radioactive material into water poses an increas-
ing threat to all forms of life.
As to the second aspect of the pollution problem—why industry
has done an inadequate job of waste treatment—the explanation lies in
simple economics. Industrial concerns are in business for one basic
reason: to turn a profit. Waste treatment facilities cost money to con-
struct, maintain and operate. Except in rare cases, where the treatment
process recovers products with a value in excess of the cost of the
treatment, money invested in waste treatment constitutes an economic
loss. The choice, then, between investing fixed and operating capital
in waste treatment or investing it in some other phase of the industrial
process that will yield a return on investment, provides no real chal-
lenge to the industrial decision maker."
Industry's wastes must be disposed of, but that is one reason in-
dustrial firms locate on watercourses in the first place. Through most
of the nation's economic development water use has been regarded as
a free economic good." Under the traditional policy of industrial waste
disposal, the merits of any waste disposal process were judged by two
criteria: (1) Was the waste placed beyond the range of the sense
organs of the disposer and (2) was the process essentially cost free?
Because it is so easy and inexpensive to dump wastes into a stream,
adjustment to the notion of investing in special treatment procedures
is difficult.
Unfortunately, we cannot all live upstream. To the extent the
wastes cannot be dissolved immediately and assimilated by the re-
ceiving water, the costs of the laissez-faire approach to waste disposal
13 Summing up industry's attitude, Mr. William R. Adams, on behalf of the Pulp,
Paper & Paperboard Institute, said to a Senate Subcommittee:
Today, as professional managers, we must ordinarily justify the expenditure
of money for capital improvements on the basis of the rate of return on the
dollars invested. However, the cost of waste treatment facilities does not provide
any adequate return on investment. Therefore, such investments consume capital
which would otherwise be available for investment in job-creating facilities. The
dilemma confronting the professional manager is summed up like this:
The general public wants both blue water in streams and adequate employ-
ment for the community.
Hearings on S. 4 Before the Special Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1965).
14 See R. Hammond, Benefit-Cost Analysis and Water-Pollution Control' 39-54
(1960); A. Kneese, Water Pollution, Economic Aspects and Research Needs 18-28 (1962).
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are borne by the downstream user who has to cleanse the water to
make it suitable for his use. The general public also bears a portion
of the cost in the form of opportunity loss resulting from the diminished
range of desired uses which can be made of the polluted water." As
a member of the water-using public, industry may accrue a propor-
tionate share of the indirect cost of pollution through loss in property
value or inability to attract a high quality work force to the area; but
generally, these costs are so hidden that they are either not perceived
or are regarded as inconsequential in comparison to the cost of in-
stituting and maintaining an adequate waste management program.
The long history of the development and exploitation of this na-
tion's natural resources by private enterprise demonstrates conclusively
that, in the absence of legal compulsions, only when it is to the clear
economic advantage of the developer-exploiter will water resources
be conserved and the public interest in their prudent use recognized.
Popular concern for the degradation of our water resources is wide-
spread and seemingly mounts with each year of additional spoilage.
For water-polluting industries who market products directly to the
public, it would appear the time is nigh when economic factors relating
to public relations will require adequate treatment of water-destined
waste discharges."
III. MAJOR SOURCES OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION
It is difficult to provide a fair overview of industrial water pollu-
tion since the water quality problems posed by different industry wastes
are disparate in their effect as well as in their prevention and cure.
The difficulties are further increased because the "facts" of industrial
waste management are not easily assembled, partly because no reliable
factual inventory of industrial waste treatment practices exists," and
partly because the interpretation to be placed on what data is available
is in dispute.
In recognition of the differences among industries in the nature
and degree of their pollution problems, the following discussion is
focused on what are generally acknowledged to be the major sources
15 A. Kneese, The Economics of Regional Water Quality Management 54-55 (1964);
Delogu, Effluent Charges: A Method of Enforcing Stream Standards, 19 Maine L. Rev.
29, 40 (1967).
16 See FWPCA Commissioner Quigley's discussion of the growing public relations
considerations in industrial pollution control in Industrial Water Pollution Control, in
Mill and Factory 44-49 (Nov. 1966).
17 The FWPCA is currently conducting a nationwide industrial waste inventory to
attempt to gain specific knowledge about the character and level of industrial pollution.
Industry cooperation in this effort has been something less than wholehearted. Apparently,
the fear is that the facts revealed may be subsequently used in enforcement proceedings.
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as 1967 House Hearings] (statement of Assistant Secretary of the
Interior Frank C. Di Luzio).
557
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
of industrial pollution. This brief survey is offered as an objective
presentation of the industrial pollution situation as discoverable from
public information sources.
It is submitted that the following group of problem industries
appear on practically every published list of serious present and
potential sources of industrial water pollution: Pulp and Paper, Food
Processing, Chemicals, Metal Manufacturing, Textiles, Mining, Petro-
leum, Power Production, and Nuclear. This listing is not intended to
rank industries on the basis of the pollution threat they pose; is nor to
be an exhaustive inventory of industries with waste disposal prob-
lems."' Rather, the following examination is an attempt to describe the
pollutional characteristics of these industries' most critical wastes, in-
cluding the general nature of the wastes produced, the effect of the
wastes on receiving waters, the waste treatment techniques available
for purifying the wastes, and the relative magnitude of the pollution
load caused by the industry.
A. Pulp and Paper
The conversion of wood into pulp and pulp into paper are ex-
tremely wet processes that require immense amounts of water and
produce large amounts of raw pollutants in the form of suspended
wood fibers and "pulping liquor."" If discharged directly, these pollu-
tants may cause significant discoloration and place an oxygen demand
on the receiving waters so great as to suffocate all aquatic life in the
immediate vicinity of the discharge. The wood fibers may form sludge
banks which settle to the bottom and slowly decompose, blocking
stream flow and robbing the water of precious oxygen.'
Widely practiced treatment processes for handling pulp and paper
wastes include closed system filtering and recycling of waste water to
recover valuable fibers and fillers, aerobic biological processes to
digest organic wastes, chemical precipitation to remove discoloration
18 In response to a direct question from an industry journalist, Secretary of the
Interior Udall has singled out steel, chemical, meat packing and pulp and paper as the
major industrial polluters. 2 Chemical 26 No. 12 (Dec. 1966).
10 Examples of other large industries considered to contribute substantially to the
industrial pollution problem include leather processing, automobile manufacturing and
soap production. See generally Hanks & Kube, supra note 4, at 57-78.
20 "The production of one ton of kraft pulp by traditional methods requires approxi-
mately 36,000 gallons of water and creates raw wastes with a strength equivalent to the
oxygen demand of one day's domestic sewage from about 360 people." Some large Wisconsin
pulp mills have production capacities .of over 300 tons per day. Carmichael, Forty Years
of Water Pollution Control in Wisconsin: A Case Study, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 350, 403.
"Pulping liquor" is composed of the chemicals used to separate the wood fibers from the
raw wood and the residue of wood chemicals and binding agents that remain after the
wood fibers have been extracted. Id. at 403-05.
21 A giant paper mill on the Coose River in Georgia discharges an effluent placing an
oxygen demand on the receiving waters equivalent to the untreated sewage of a city of
200,000 people. D. Carr, supra note 2, at 150.
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and lagooning of waste water for extended periods.22 Because several
different pulping processes are utilized within the industry to separate
the wood fibers, the types of wastes produced and the waste treatment
practices employed vary from mill to mill.' In-plant recovery processes
and lagooning are the most frequently used waste treatment measures.
Long identified as an egregious polluter, the wood pulp industry
has been working on an organized basis for over 20 years to dis-
cover improved methods for dealing with its waste disposal problems.24
The industry claims to have reduced the pollution load per ton of
paper by 60 percent in the past 20 years,' and there seems little
doubt that in new plants special care is given to the engineering of
adequate waste treatment facilities.26 Nevertheless, one-fifth of the
existing pulp and paper mills have no pollution control processes and,
in many of the plants that do treat their wastes, the treatment is far
from complete.' Therefore, the wood pulp industry is still a front
runner in the industrial pollution derby.
B. Food Processing
Food processing is a rubric applied to a large variety of inde-
pendent manufacturing concerns whose principal common denominator
is the similarity of their waste products. The food processing industries
discharge an organic effluent which, if untreated, may severely strain
the assimilative capacity of the receiving water. Typical liquid wastes
include spoiled, raw and manufactured animal or vegetable materials,
washing waters, transporting waters, cooking and processing wastes,
overflows and unusable portions of the raw material. The most widely
publicized pollution villains among food processors are probably the
meat packing industry and dairy products manufacturers.' The waste
22 N. Nemerow, Theories and Practices of Industrial Waste Treatment 378 (1963).
23 See H. Gehm, Pulp, Paper and Paperboard, in Industrial Wastes, Their Disposal
and Treatment 194 (Rudolf s ed. 1953) ; 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 512-29.
24 One interesting use made of sulfite mill liquor is to spread the waste over country
dirt roads where it acts to settle dust and to bind the loose particles together to make
a firmer road. Hearings on S. 649 Before a Special Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution
of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 548 (1963). •
25 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 522. Wisconsin paper mills are currently
spending 10% of their capital investments for pollution control. 2 CCH Water Control
News, No. 28, at 9 (Nov. 27, 1967).
28 The Pacific Northwest Pollution Control Ass'n recently cited the Weyerhaeuser
Company for the efficient pollution control design and operation of its Cosmopolis, Wash-
ington, pulp plant. 2 CCH Water Control News, No. 25, at 10 (Nov. 6, 1967).
27 One basic problem of the industry is its size and the volume of processing done.
Pulp and paper is the nation's fifth largest industry and its third most rapidly growing.
The volume of wastes handled is such that even 95% effective treatment may be inade-
quate to permit discharge of the treated waste water into receiving waters.
28 Other food processing industries with significant waste disposal problems are
canning, cereal grain processing, distilling, brewing, yeast manufacturing, vegetable oil
processing and beet sugar refining.
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products from both of these industries are particularly offensive if
introduced into neighboring waters in an untreated form. Not only do
the blood, hooves, paunch manure, and grease dumped by the meat
packer, and the spoiled milk, cream, and whey discharged by the
dairy processor defile the appearance of water in a disgusting fashion,'
but they may also exhaust the dissolved oxygen in the water for miles
below their point of introduction, killing fish and other aquatic life.
The standard methods for treating food processing wastes are very
similar to the bio-oxidation measures employed for human sewage?'
For this reason, in-town food processors are increasingly trying to
realize economies of scale by contracting with local governments for
treatment of their industrial wastes in municipal plants. Separate waste
treatment facilities may be required of large in-town food processors'
and such facilities are clearly necessary for processing plants located
in rural areas. Some progress is being made in treating food processing
wastes, but much of it has come only because the food processors have
been under orders of local pollution control agencies. Although food
processing ranks high among the nation's polluters, improvements in
this industry's waste disposal practices seem to come only after pro-
tracted delays.' Stalling tactics may serve only to postpone the in-
evitable closing of the small creameries and other marginal food pro-
cessors for whom reasonable waste treatment is economically impos-
sible.
C. Chemicals
The chemical industry is expanding more rapidly than any other
American industry.' A great portion of this phenomenal growth is
attributable to the development of synthetic organic chemicals from
which are made such products as plastics, nylon, medicines, dyes,
29 For a graphic description of the effect of the packing plant discharges, see J.
Wright, supra note 2, at 134-37. For a discussion of the effect of dairy product manu-
facturing on waste water, see Carmichael, supra note 20, at 402.
30 See N. Nemerow, supra note 22, at 311, 314, 325, 346.
31 A municipal treatment plant may not have the physical capacity or the treatment
ability to handle the added volume or potency of a food processor's waste load. See id.
at 8-11. For an interesting case growing out of this situation, see the North Carolina
Att'y Gen.'s Op., Aug. 21, 1967, reported in 2 CCH Water Control News, No. 19, at 7-8
(Sept. 25, 1967), ruling unlawful a city's attempt to contribute funds to a local pickle
plant to construct its own treatment facilities. The brine waste from the pickling process
threatened to destroy the effectiveness of the city's disposal plant and the city engineers
suggested that the financial aid to the pickle plant would have been the least cost solution
to the problem.
32 For example, meat packing firms in Omaha that have been subject to federal
enforcement since 1957 are only now getting their wastes processed at a minimal level of
treatment. See F. Graham, supra note 2, at 52-84. See also Carmichael, supra note 20,
at 400-02 (delays resulting from lack of cooperation within the milk industry).
33 In 1963, the chemical industry ranked fourth in total assets and fifth in sales
among American industries. Projections are that chemical sales will double by 1975,
having increased fivefold between 1939 and 1963. Staff Report, supra note 6, at 14. •
560
INDUSTRIAL WATER POLLUTION
adhesives, detergents and pesticides.' With the emergence of the
synthetic chemical industry has come a new kind of water pollution
problem because wastes from the manufacture and use of these synthetic
chemical products are increasingly finding their way into the nation's
waters. It is known that some of the synthetic chemicals are directly
toxic to various forms of aquatic life," while others act to break down
the natural aquatic .food chains. Whether they may have long-term
toxic effects on humans is not known for certain. In fact, the most dis-
turbing aspect of these new inhabitants of our environment is that we
do not know very much about them: we do not know their effects on
water and water users; we do not have reliable devices to detect their
presence; a' nor do we know how to remove them from water effect-
ively." All that is known is that these chemicals are reaching public
water supplies in increasing amounts." 8
At the moment, a considerable research effort is being mounted
to evaluate the environment-polluting effects of the synthetics and
their wastes. Synthetic chemical products and wastes behave peculiarly
in water, sometimes combining with other substances to form mys-
terious new compounds:" Many synthetic compounds do not respond
to ordinary waste treatment procedures (in fact, some of the chemicals
impede the treatment of other wastes) 4° and some are not readily
broken down even by the natural biologic processes that take place in
the moving waters into which they are discharged. Researchers are
seeking methods for creating biodegradable synthetic chemicals, a
technological breakthrough which would be comparable to that achieved
with "soft" detergents." The major synthetic producers have done a
creditable job in assuming the responsibility for monitoring and treat-
ing their effluents:12 In many instances, the synthetic chemical industry
34 An exhibit listing examples of products of the basic chemical manufacturing in-
dustry occupies eight pages in the published record of the 1965 Senate Hearings. Hearings
Before the Special Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public
Works, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1009-16 (1965) [hereinafter cited at 1965 Senate
Hearings].
35 Over 5 million fish were killed in the lower reaches of the Mississippi River in
1963 when Endrin, a chlorinated hydrocarbon insecticide, turned up in the water in a
dilute, yet lethal, concentration. The efforts to pin the fish kills on the chemical and to
trace the chemical's source are described in F. Graham, supra note 2, at 107-35. See
generally R. Carson, The Silent Spring 39-51, 129-52 (1962).
aa Staff Report, supra note 6, at 15.
37 It is worth noting that one of the leading authorities on waste treatment devotes
only two pages to the treatment of insecticides and concludes with the ominous note that,
although there is increasing concern, At the present time, little treatment of these
wastes is being practiced." N. Nemerow, supra note 22, at 489-90.
38 Report of the Environmental Pollution Panel, supra note 3, at 73.
30 See Rodale, supra note 2, at 420.
40 Staff Report, supra note 6, at 15.
41 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, pt. I, at 158-60.
42 The Du Pont Corporation spends in excess of 1 million dollars a year for pollution
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is an involuntary polluter, many of whose exotic products and wastes
currently defy cleansing.
The sizable segment of the chemical industry not engaged in the
production of synthetics also presents pollution problems. Organic
wastes from industries such as those concerned with petrochemicals and
inorganic wastes from many other chemical production processes
diminish water quality in a variety of ways. The effect of natural
organic chemical wastes on water is generally similar to the action of
other organic pollutants and, therefore, pollution conditions are usually
the result of inadequate application of known waste treatment tech-
niques."
Inorganic chemicals degrade water in less overt ways, causing
undesirable tastes, odors, and colors and an increased mineralization
that results in water hardness and corrosion. While many inorganic
chemicals are toxic in high concentration, others, such as phosphorus
and nitrogen, act to nourish plant organisms. The resulting growth is
largely responsible for the nuisance vegetation now choking many
streams and for the eutrophication threatening numerous lakes." The
treatment methods available for removing inorganic chemicals from
water are generally more complex and costly than those for treating
organic wastes. For this reason, inorganic wastes, in high volume,"
are frequently poured directly into receiving waters.
D. Metals Manufacturing
The manufacturing process by which raw ores are converted into
useful metal products requires substantial amounts of water for cooling
and processing. The waste water produced by metal making contains
various concentrations of metallic substances, acids, alkalies, phenols
and grease. The liquid wastes creating the most serious disposal prob-
lem are the so-called "pickling liquor" used to remove the oxide scale
from certain steel products prior to further processing and the rinse
water used to wash the steel after it has been pickled." The pickling
liquor contains diluted sulfuric acid and a high concentration of ferrous
control in its plant on the Kanawha River in West Virginia. P. Briggs, supra note 2,
at 158.
43 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 3, at 1002 -09.
44 Eutrophication is the aging process that affects all bodies of water, eventually
causing them to fill with solid matter. There is strong evidence that man's careless waste
disposal practices accelerate this process remarkably. For excellent discussions of lake
eutrophication problems, see Hearings on S. 1591 and S. 1604 Before the Subcomm. on
Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st sess.,
pt. 1, at 423-92 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Senate Hearings].
45 See Staff Report, supra note 6, at 14; 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 3,
at 1007.
40 R. Hoak, Steel Pickling, in Industrial Wastes, Their Disposal and Treatment
255 (Rudolfs ed. 1953).
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sulfate; the rinse water contains the same wastes, but in a much less
concentrated form. The pollution effect of discharging these wastes
directly into water is more aesthetic than it is biologic. High concentra-
tions of the acids are toxic to aquatic life and gradual oxidation of the
iron suspended in nontoxic discharges turns the receiving waters a
rust color. Although not of great potency, the volume of the pickling
wastes is such that some form of treatment is essential.' Generally,
in-plant recovery processes are not economically efficient. Therefore,
the industry practice is either to neutralize the acidity of the wastes
with an alkaline material and then lagoon them or to inject them un-
treated into suitable underground strata.48 The phenol, cyanide, oil and
other less voluminous metal processing wastes may place a more severe
overall burden on receiving waters if discharged without treatment.'
These organic wastes require the same type of biologic treatment as
sanitary sewage.
Much of the steel industry's reputation as a polluter has grown
from the waste disposal methods practiced at the industry's older and
often outmoded plants. For example, in the Mahoning River Valley of
Ohio and Pennsylvania where the American steel industry began, the
wastes of the steel mills in the valley have literally killed a substantial
portion of the Mahoning River. Reportedly, the river cannot sustain
aquatic life and its waters are unsuitable for any other type of use°
The industry's recent record for waste treatment is not altogether un-
impressive;" however, a great deal of additional effort appears neces-
sary to bring many of its waste disposal practices within tolerable
limits."
47 It is estimated that the industry currently produces over 600 million gallons of
pickling liquor annually and four to twenty times that amount of waste rinse water. Id.
at 256.
49 N. Nemerow, supra note 22, at 400-03.
49 A 1965 Public Health Service report on pollution in southern Lake Michigan
stated that one large steel plant was daily discharging into the lake 230 million gallons of
waste water containing 13,750 pounds of ammonia nitrogen, 1500 pounds of phenol,
1700 pounds of cyanide, and 54,000 pounds of oil. See F. Graham, supra note 2, at 149.
5° P. Briggs, supra note 2, at 148-49. The temperature of the river was once recorded
at 117° F. Id. at 148.
51 In re Pollution of the Interstate Waters of the Grand Calumet River, 5 U.S. Delft
of HEW. 1510-24 (1965) (reporting the progress in pollution control by the Chicago
area steel mills). 2 CCH Water Control News, No. 30, at 12 (Dec. 11, 1967) (steel com-
pany constructing 20 million dollar waste treatment facility).
52 In a Senate Hearing exhibit, the Armco Steel Corporation stated that it would
be required to expend 65 million dollars over the next five years to meet the proposed
air and water quality standards. 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 643. This sum
is compared to the 16.9 million dollars spent by the company during the preceding 15
years. Id. More solid figures on needed improvements are provided by an announcement
by Bethlehem Steel that the company will spend 25-30 million dollars between 1966 and
1970 on pollution corrective measures in its Lackawanna plant in response to a viola-
tion order issued by the New York State Department of Health. 1 CCH Water Control
News; No. 22, at 4 (Oct. 17, 1966).
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E. Mining
The mining and processing of nearly every mineral create waste
products that will pollute waters if not carefully handled. Acid drainage
from coal mines, however, clearly poses the most immediate threat to
the quality of the nation's waters.' Sulfur-bearing minerals exposed in
coal mining combine with air and water to form sulfuric acid which, in
turn, drains into watercourses destroying aquatic life" and generally
rendering the waters unfit for most beneficial uses." Today, it is
estimated that acid pollution from both surface and underground mine
drainage is attacking over 4000 miles of United States streams."
More than half of this pollution originates in abandoned mines, the
acids coming from surface waters running over mine wastes or escaping
from underground mines improperly closed. The acid drainage originat-
ing from inactive mines presents a particularly challenging pollution
control problem because of the difficulty in effectively assigning re-
sponsibility for carrying out corrective measures.
In the case of active mining operations, the control of the acid
waste discharge involves either treatment to neutralize the waste flow
or planning to prevent the formation of the wastes." Neutralization
techniques are expensive and frequently create a new waste with which
to contend." Therefore, industry prefers preventive measures. Be-
cause water and air are both necessary to support the chemical action
producing the mine acids, it is estimated that preventive measures such
as careful water flow control during mining operations and flooding
or air sealing inactive mine areas could wipe out over 70 percent
of existing mine acid pollution." These problems are receiving a good
deal of current attention as both state and federal pollution control
officials are beginning to apply pressure to stop the flow of mine
acids."
53 93% of the acid mining pollution in impoundments and 97% in streams result
from coal mining. 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 44, at 322. In the Appalachian area,
two-thirds of all streams tested were acid polluted to the point that they could not sup-
port fish life. Id.
54 Acid mine drainage killed about one million fish in the Allegheny River during
August, 1966. 2 CCH Water Control News, No. 24, at 7 (Oct. 30, 1967).
55 An estimated over 4 million tons of acid-equivalents are annually discharged
into streams by active and abandoned coal mines. 3.2 million acres of land are producing
acid drainage and this figure is increasing at the rate of 150,000 acres per year. Costs,
supra note 4, at 36.
56 Program, supra note 5, at 2.
57 See W. Hodge, Waste Disposal Problem in the Coal Mining Industry, in Indus-
trial Wastes, Their Disposal and Treatment 312-411 (Rudolfs ed. 1953).
58 New and less costly neutralization techniques are being sought. Bureau of Mines
researchers have produced a relatively efficient neutralization process using coarse native
limestone. 2 CCH Water Control News, No. 2, at 4 (May 29, 1967).
59 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 44, at 322 -23.
60 Pennsylvania stiffened its acid mine drainage laws in 1965 and already is re-
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F. Textiles
The textile industry has long been guilty of discharging polluting
wastes into northern rivers, but generally the volume of wastes dis-
charged has been small in relation to the flow of the receiving waters.
Thus, serious pollution situations have been fairly isolated. In con-
trast, however, the expansion of the textile industry in the South in
recent years has placed a great assimilation burden on the warmer,
slower moving southern rivers, with the result that pollution situations
attributed to the textile industries occur more frequently.'
The wastes produced in the manufacture of textile products vary
somewhat in pollution characteristics depending on the nature of the
fibers being processed. Wool processing produces a "scouring liquor"
highly contaminated with grease, dirt and spent cleansing agents."
Cotton, flax, hemp and jute processing involves the removal of natural
waxes, fats and coloring from the fibers by scouring, bleaching and
dyeing procedures that produce a waste water rich in polluting ma-
terials." The waste treatment methods conventionally employed are
approximately the same for both animal and vegetable fibers, the
principal difference being the use of a special cracking process to
remove the grease from wool processing liquor. The cleansed liquor may
then be treated biologically through any one of several standard
processes." Caustic wastes produced in the finishing of cotton and
other textiles require a more complex treatment.
When the textile plants first began to concentrate their activities
in southern states the industrialization they represented was highly
coveted and complaints about their waste disposal practices were rarely
heard. It would appear that the honeymoon is ending as the various
state pollution control agencies in the South are beginning to take
cognizance of the pollution conditions associated with the industry.'
porting improvements. See 2 CCH Water Control News, No. 18, at 5 (Sept. 18, 1967);
id. No. 35, at 5 (Jan. 15, 1968). Legislation was introduced in the last session of Congress
to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to provide for acid pollution control
demonstration projects. S. 1870, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). This bill passed the Senate
on Dec. 11, 1967. 2 CCH Water Control News, No. 31, at 1 (Dec. 18, 1967).
61 One textile mill on the Chattooga River in Georgia is reported to discharge an
effluent with a strength equivalent to the sanitary sewage of 112,000 people. D. Carr,
Death of the Sweet Waters 150 (1966).
62 See S. Coburn, Textile Dying and Finishing, in Industrial Wastes, Their Dis-
posal and Treatment 171 (Rudolfs ed. 1953), where it is stated that from 1000 to 4000
gallons of waste water are produced for .each 1000 pounds of wool processed.
63 Scouring cotton produces 3400 gallons of waste water for every 1000 pounds
of cotton produced. E. Besselievre, Industrial Waste Treatment 193 (1952).
64 See S. CobUrn, supra note 62, at 172-91.
65 Pollution control officials of both Alabama and Georgia recently admitted that
the textile plants in their states were among the most serious of their polluters. 1965
Senate Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 2, at 547, 565.
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G. Petroleum
In the petroleum industry, manufacturing is divided into two
separate operations: production and refining. The water pollution prob-
lems associated with oil production are quite different in nature from
the difficulties created by the cracking and refining process. Long a
leader in the design and operation of pollution control measures at
both stages of its manufacturing business," the petroleum industry has
been so successful that the major danger from oil pollution today
stems from accidental spills or seepage and from the escape of the
brine that often appears in the drilling process. The pollution from the
recent wreck of the tanker Torrey Canyon off the coast of Cornwall,
England illustrates the hazards of transporting petroleum products
by water." When oil spillage or seepage and brine find their way to
underground or surface waters, their pollutional effect is severe."
Modern production techniques, however, are credited with reducing
such dangers to a minimum."
One characteristic of the modern oil industry is that the waste
product from one process becomes the raw product for another. There-
fore, a good deal of the potential pollution load from oil operations
never escapes the plant but is salvaged as a useful product through
various recovery techniques. Nevertheless, each step in the process
does produce unusable liquid wastes that require disposal. The treat-
ment methods required to purify this variety of wastes are too numer-
ous and complex to merit description here," except to note they are
well known to the industry and are generally practiced with a con-
scientiousness that other industries might do well to emulate."-
an See P. Briggs, Water the Vital Essence 154-56 (1966). The oil industry has not
always worn a white hat in waste disposal matters. As recently as 1963 a major oil
company confessed its contribution to the degrading of Arthur Kill, New Jersey. Hear-
ings on Water Pollution Control and Abatement Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess , pt 1A, at 898 (1963).
67 The Torrey Canyon broke apart on Seven Stones Reef, March 18, 1967, dis-
charging 118,000 tons of crude oil into the North Atlantic, much of which washed ashore
along the English coast. See generally Utton, Protective Measures and the "Torrey
Canyon," 9 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 613 (1968). The British government has threatened
legal action against the American owner of the tanker. I CCH Water Control News,
No. 50, at 7 (May 1, 1967). In this country the disaster sparked the introduction in
Congress of a spate of bills to amend the federal Oil Production Act to provide a
remedy for the Torrey Canyon type of problem. See 1967 Senate Hearings, supra note 44.
08 The Arkansas and Red Rivers are reported still suffering some pollutional
after-effects from oil-field brines that have escaped into their tributaries. L. Herber,
Crisis in Our Cities 85 (1965).
09 Old oil production operations still cause some pollution. See 2 CCH Water
Control News, No. I, at 8 (May 22, 1967), where Pennsylvania authorities report oil
pollution of the upper reaches of the Allegheny River.
70 See generally R. Weston, R. Merman & J. DeMann, Waste Disposal Problems
of the Petroleum Industry, in Industrial Wastes, Their Disposal and Treatment 419
(Rudolfs ed. 1953) ; N. Nemerow, supra note 22, at 429-40.
77 In the Public Health Service studies of the Lake Michigan pollution situation,
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H. Power Production
Almost two-thirds of the water withdrawn by industry is used for
cooling purposes and the largest single user of cooling waters is the
electric power production industry. Water returned after use in a
cooling process is generally unaltered in all of its physical properties
save one—its temperature. Today's most efficient steam-electric gen-
erating stations dissipate about 50 percent of the heat value in con-
densing circulating water." A modern nuclear power plant can raise
the temperature of waters used for cooling as much as 20°."
The addition of heat to water causes many of the same effects as
the discharge of an organic pollution load. Increasing the temperature
of water diminishes the amount of oxygen which can be held in solu-
tion and correspondingly reduces waste assimilation capacity of the
water and its ability to support aquatic life." Thus, the addition of
heat to Water is regarded as a polluting activity—thermal pollution.
"Waste" treatment procedures include the use of cooling towers and
canals and the design of facilities that add less of a heat load to the
waters used.
Electric power production has approximately doubled every
decade, and the current introduction of nuclear powered electric plants
rhay act to accelerate that growth rate. The use of water for cooling
purposes in the power production process is expected to increase in a
direct relationship with the expansion of the industry." As more of
the nation's waters are impounded and river and stream flows sub-
jected to greater controls, thermal pollution will become an increas-
ingly more important factor in water quality management."
Cities Service's pollution control effort was singled out for praise. Shell's refinery at
Anacrotes, Washington, discharges a waste water 'stream so pure that it must be piped
beyond the oyster beds near shore because the oysters require a saltier water. Humble's
oil refinery at Baytown, Texas, won for the company the Izaak Walton League's
Honor Roll Award for its comprehensive waste treatment systems. 1 CCH Water Con-
trol News, No. 13, at 6 .(Aug. 15, 1966).
72 See Report of the Environmental Pollution Panel, President's Science Advisory
Comm., Restoring the Quality of Our Environment 71-72 (1965).
73 An interesting clash occurred in the fall of 1967 between Senator Muskie and
the AEC over the question of thermal pollution. It was the AEC's position that it did
not have authority to consider the heat pollution effects of nuclear power plants as a
part of its licensing function. Senator Muskie disputed this vigorously. An exchange of
correspondence on the issue is reproduced in 2 CCH Water Control News; No. 27, at 3-6
(Nov. 20, 1967).
71 Warming water also increases bacterial action which'further accelerates depletion
of the water's oxygen resources. N. Nemerow, Theories and Practices of Industrial Waste
Treatment 5 (1963).
75 Growth projections for the year 2000 show a fivefold to tenfold increase in
electric power capacity. Nat'l Acad. of Sci., Nat'l Research Council, Waste Management
and Control, Pub. No. 1400, at 13 (1966).
70 See 2 CCH Water Control News; No. 31, at 3 (Dec. 18, 1967) Bregman, Putting
Waste Heat in its Place, U.S. Dept. of the Interior News Release, Aug. 1, 1968; Edwards,
Legal Control of Thermal Pollution, id. Aug. 6, 1968.
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I. Nuclear
Industries based on nuclear technology are still in their infancy;
however, the wastes from this expanding group of industries loom very
large on the environmental pollution horizon. Sources of radioactive
pollution include residue produced in the mining and refining of radio-
active minerals, wastes from nuclear reactors, and waste products re-
sulting from radioactive substances used in science, medicine and
industry." Radioactivity in the nation's waters is now well below the
safe allowable levels, but the danger from isolated, accidental discharges
of radioactive materials is ever present's Several procedures have been
developed for treating radioactive waters,' but the ultimate disposal
of liquid nuclear waste products is usually accomplished -through
depositing the wastes in nonporous underground formations. Not even
this waste disposal technique is wholly free from danger and the fear
of accidental radioactive spillage is understandably disquieting to
persons concerned with downstream water quality. 80
J. Summing up the Industrial Pollution Problem
To the nine major problem areas discussed above must be added
the wastes of dozens of other manufacturing and processing industries
of lesser size involving thousands of individual plants, each one of
which creates an effluent that must be disposed of in some manner. It
is not possible to assess accurately the total debilitating effect on our
natural environment caused by this flood of industrial wastes. The
most casual empirical observation substantiates the thesis that our
waters have suffered an enormous deterioration in quality as a result
of the industrial wastes discharged into them. Also clear is the prophesy
that, unless drastic changes are made in industry's waste disposal
habits, the worst is yet to come.
To state the problem in a nutshell, industry currently does an
inadequate job of waste water treatment. Over the next three decades
industry's wastes will increase seven times. Merely to preserve the
present quality of the nation's waters during this period would require
gigantic strides in industrial waste management. To carry out the
7 7 Staff Report, supra note 6, at 15.
78 A federal enforcement conference was held in connection with the Animas River
in Colorado in 1958, when it was discovered that the radioactivity level in the river was
unnaturally high owing to wastes discharged from the mill tailing of a uranium mine.
The situation has now been substantially corrected, although some problems still exist.
Hearings on Radioactive Water Pollution in the Colorado River Basin Before the Sub-
comm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966).
79 N. Nemerow, supra note 74, at 515-37.
88 See, e.g., Comments of the Fish and Wildlife Service in connection with a pro-
posed nuclear power station on the James River in Virginia, in 2 CCH Water Control
News, No. 23, at 13-15 (Oct. 23, 1967).
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water quality enhancement program on which this nation has appar-
ently embarked will require a crash program in industrial waste man-
agement of truly awesome dimensions.
IV. EVOLUTION OF A NATIONAL WATER QUALITY POLICY
The purpose of [this Act] is to enhance the quality and
value of our water resources and to establish a national policy
for the prevention, control, and abatement of water pollu-
tion."
This declaration of policy was added to the Water Pollution
Control Act by the Water Quality Act of 1965." Congressional sup-
porters of vigorous pollution control celebrated the passage of the
1965 Act as marking an historic milestone on the road to improving
environmental quality.' President Johnson characterized the statute
as reflecting the nation's determination to attack its pollution problems
and to control its environment." The 1965 Act was followed in rapid
succession by a wholesale reorganization of the federal pollution con-
trol effort' and passage of the 1966 Clean Water Restoration Act,"
which substantially increased the federal funds allocated to solving
water pollution problems." Without doubt, the federal activity of the
past few years has generated a great nationwide interest in water pol-
81 Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 466(a) (1964), as amended, (Supp. I
1965) [hereinafter cited as Control Act].
82 33 U.S.C. § 466(a) (Supp. I 1965).
83 See 2 CCH Water Control News, No. 2, at 2 (May 29, 1967) where Secretary
Udall refers to the recent federal activity as "the turning point in the war on water
pollution."
Senator Muskie has said, "Prior to the enactment of this legislation, our primary
concern was with repairing past damage and slowing the advance of pollution. Now, we
have turned the corner, to focus on tomorrow's needs as well as today's crises." Univ. of
Mich., Proceedings of the National Symposium on Quality Standards for Natural Waters
6 (July 1966) [hereinafter cited as Symposium].
Congressman Blatnik has similarly noted that, "We finally realize that such
national goals as pollution abatement are properly compared to our goals in military
science or space exploration. The priority of the pollution abatement effort is rising as
knowledge increases and apathy is replaced by a call for action." 1967 House Hearings,
supra note 17, at 2.
84 Message from the President of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 237, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1968).
85 Administrative responsibility for the Federal Water Pollution Control Admin-
istration was transferred from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to the
Department of the Interior. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1966, 5 U.S.C. § 133z-13
(Supp. II 1965-66).
86 80 Stat. 1246 (1966), amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 466a, c-1, c, d, e, g, j (1964), as
amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66k (Supp. I 1965).
87 The 1966 Act was an important legislative step in the pollution control activity
of the federal government. Among the Act's more important features was the encourage-
ment of basin planning agencies. For a brief analysis of the key provisions of the Act,
see Hines, N6r Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality Part III: The
Federal Effort, 52 Iowa L: Rev. 799, 837-38 (1967).
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lution problems and has provided a valuable momentum to efforts to
protect and improve the quality of the nation's waters." An important
question raised by these congressional and executive acts and their
subsequent implementation is whether there is emerging a specific
national policy concerning water quality.
Initially, it should be noted that water pollution control has tra-
ditionally been regarded as an activity to be carried out through the
police power of state and local governments." The federal role has
always been conceived as a supplementary one, providing program
support, technical assistance, research, financial assistance in facility
construction and back-up enforcement. In recent federal activity, care
has been taken not to tread too heavily on the primacy reserved to
state and local pollution control programs." Nevertheless, the 1965
and 1966 federal acts clearly express a congressional judgment that
the states were doing too little, too slowly, in the abatement of pollution.
The Water Quality Act of 1965 is the key measure in the federal
effort to accelerate the attack on pollution. The 1965 Act was consid-
ered by three sessions of Congress before all of the wrinkles were
ironed out. As finally passed and implemented by the Federal Water
Pollution Control Administration (FWPCA), which it created, the
1965 Act represents a masterful exercise in federal-state brinksman-
ship. The dissatisfaction with the results of state abatement efforts
was tactfully expressed through the announcement of a national policy
to enhance water quality. In order to spur the tempo of state pollution
control, the Act requires nationwide water quality standards to be
established."
55 Senator Muskie has described the change in national attitude in these terms:
"The discussion has shifted from the issue of whether or not we should improve the
quality of our water to the issue of how to best accomplish our objectives." 1966 Senate
Hearings, supra note 4, at 306. For a discussion of the importance of momentum in the
water quality control effort, see 1967 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 2-73 (statements
of John Charles Daly and Hon. Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the Interior).
89 Mt is declared to be the .policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the states in preventing and
controlling water pollution, to support and aid ,technical research relating to the
prevention and control of water pollution, and to provide Federal technical
services and financial aid to State and interstate agencies and to municipalities
in connection with the prevention and control of water pollution.
Control Act, supra note 81, § 466(b).
00 A proposal to strengthen substantially the federal enforcement arm was firmly
rejected in 1966. The incursion on state authority was a major ground for the rejec-
tion. See 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 327-45. Preserving a balance between
state and federal responsibilities in the water pollution field has been a dilemma for
Congress for some time. See H.R. Rep. No. 215, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted
in 2 U.S. Code Cong. 8.z Ad. News 3313-24 (1965) ; Hines, supra note 87, at 800-03.
01 It should not be assumed that the idea of national water quality standards
only recently emerged on the pollution control scene. The 1955 Act, which created the
Federal Water Pollution Control Agency on a permanent basis, originally contained pro-
visions requiring the establishment of federal ,water quality standards. Hearings on S.
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Although federal power with respect to water quality standards
is expressly limited to interstate waters, federal officials frankly admit
that they would be surprised if the states do not generally proceed to
set similar standards for intrastate waters as wel1. 92 This expectation
seems founded on sound administrative principles. Liberal provision
was made for federal funding of local pollution control programs and
facilities; however, the availability of federal largess was carefully
conditioned on compliance with federal requirements in the planning
and execution of the local control effort. 93
Although the federal effort was temporarily impeded by an ad-
ministrative reorganization" and has been slowed recently by a tight-
ening of the federal purse," the purpose of the 1965 Act—to accelerate
the war on pollution—now seems certain of success as the pace of pol-
lution control activity has quickened during the last two years. The
1965 Act stands as a classic example of how, through imaginative ap-
plication of the federal carrot and stick, national goals can be achieved
through primary reliance on the machinery of local government. Con-
ceding that a considerable degree of political "savvy" lay behind the
1965 Act, the question still remains whether it is possible to discern in
that law and subsequent federal actions a meaningful national policy
relating to water quality.
In S. 649, the bill first introduced in 1963 that ultimately gained
passage in revised form as the Water Quality Act of 1965, the follow-
ing language was employed to declare the national policy:
It is the purpose of this Act to establish a positive na-
tional water pollution control policy. of keeping waters as
clean as possible as opposed to the negative policy of attempt-
890 and S. 928 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 45 (1955).
92 See 1967 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 110 (statements of FWPCA Com-
missioner Quigley). The Dean Water Restoration Act of 1966 provided an incentive
to establish intrastate water quality standards. If a state establishes intrastate standards
it can qualify for a 10% bonus under the Federal Construction Grant Program. 33 U.S.C.
§ 466e (Supp. II 1965-66).
93 See Water Quality Act of 1965, 33 U.S.C. § 466c-1 (Supp. I 1965), as amended,
(Supp. II 1965-66) (grants for research and development) ; id. § 466d (grants for water
pollution control programs) ; id. § 466e (grants for construction).
The Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966 continued these efforts to purchase im-
provement in the local pollution control programs. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 466a(c) (1), 466e(d)
(Supp. II 1965-66)-
04 For discussions of the extent of impediment to the program caused by the re-
organization, see 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 133-37.
95 Although the budgetary askings for the federal water pollution control program
are substantially below the congressional authorizations, this program has not suffered
proportionately as much as many other nonmilitary federal programs. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 30, 1968, at 20, col. 8 (Summary of President Johnson's -Fiscal 1969 Budget).
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ing to use the full capacity of such waters for waste assimila-
tion."
Industry severely criticized this phrasing," and it was ultimately
deleted in favor of the broader policy declaration that now appears in
the law. A fair reading of the subsequent federal activity, however,
reveals that the spirit of this deleted language seems to pervade the
federal water quality program as it is emerging through the FWPCA's
activity in approving state standards. Both the legislators and adminis-
trators responsible for making and enforcing federal water quality
policies appear genuinely committed to a national policy of upgrading
waters to as close to their natural state of cleanliness as is reasonably
possible. Although it is easy to discount glib political endorsements of
a "clean water" policy," it is submitted that under federal leadership
the nation has embarked on an ambitious water quality improvement
program pointed toward an ultimate goal of nationwide natural water
quality."
The 1965 Act provided relatively little guidance to the states in
developing the required water quality standards beyond the statement
that they should be consistent with the federal policy of enhancing
water quality and that they should give consideration to certain legiti-
mate water uses.'" To help fill this void of specificity the FWPCA
distributed to the states guidelines reflecting the matters to which the
federal agency would give most careful scrutiny in reviewing the state
96 S. 649, § 1, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1 963 ).
97 For a discussion of the industry position on the control of water quality, see
Hearings on S. 4 Before a Special Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate
Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 37-58 (1965) (statements of Mr. A. J.
vonFrank and Mr. William R. Adams).
98 Secretary Udall is reported to have noted poetically, "iBloth sides of the Con-
gressional aisles are full of aspiring 'Mr. Cleans', vying for the whitest hats and the fullest
canteens." 1967 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 8.
99 Secretary Udall, in response to a request for a definition of goals in the field of
environmental pollution, said, "Goals are not difficult to define.... Ultimately, I think we
are going to want all of our lakes and streams to be clean. When it becomes generally
known that this is not an impossible goal, the means will be found to achieve it." 2
Chemical 26, No. 12, at 2 (Dec. 1966). James Quigley, Commissioner of the FWPCA,
declared: "We have a national commitment to clean water, and we are committed
regardless of the economics." Symposium, supra note 83, at 11.
Frank C. Di Luzio, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Water Pollution Control,
has predicted that:
he time is not far off when even a statement that water pollution in
America "must be controlled" will prove to be inadequate and that a different
word or combination of words will be substituted for the word "controlled"
LWIe are a lot closer to the concept of eliminating pollution in this country,
as against merely controlling it, than many of us may realize today.
Di Luzio, Water Pollution Control—An American Must, 39 Water Pollution Control
Federation J. 1, 3 (1967).
100 Control Act, supra note 81, § 4668(0 (3) (Supp. 1 1965).
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standards.' It is in these guidelines that the true thrust of the federal
water quality enhancement program is disclosed.
Guideline 1 warns that in no case will standards providing for
less than existing water quality be acceptable, thus locking in high
quality water wherever it now exists. This guideline drew considerable
criticism front some states, relatively underdeveloped economically,
who are actively recruiting new industries. The so-called "degradation
issue" was resolved in February 1968, when Secretary Udall issued a
statement reaffirming the federal government's commitment to the
policy of safeguarding high quality waters against avoidable degrada-
tion."''' Guideline 2 represents the water quality floor as it provides that
no standards are acceptable that have the effect of designating any
stream for the sole or principal purpose of transporting wastes.'
Guideline 8 is most reflective of the underlying federal philosophy.
It provides that no standard will be approved that allows any wastes
amenable to treatment or control to be discharged into water without
treatment or control regardless of the use to be made of the receiving
waters. Further, the state standards must require all wastes to receive
the "best practicable treatment or control" prior to discharge unless it
can be proved that a lesser degree of treatment and control will provide
for water quality enhancement commensurate with proposed present
and future uses of the water:" The guidelines recognize that for the
immediate future it may not be economically feasible or practical to
require a complete cessation in quality impairing discharges; 105 how-
ever, acceptance of this objective as a program goal seems implicit in
the charge given the states in the guidelines.'" The overall import of
the guidelines, then, is that no standards will be acceptable that reflect
101 U.S. Department of the Interior, Guidelines for Establishing Water Quality
Standards for Interstate Waters (1966) thereinafter cited as Guidelines].
102 Id. at 4, 5. Secretary Udall has explained this guideline as requiring "any indus-
trial, public or private project or development which would constitute a new source
of pollution or an increased source of pollution of high quality waters, . . . as part of
the initial project design, to provide the highest and best degree of waste treatment
available under existing technology." 2 CCH Water Control News, No. 38, at 10 (Feb. 5,
1968).
loll Guidelines, supra note 101, at 5.
1°4 Id. at 7.
1°5 "If it is impossible to provide for prompt improvement in water quality at
the time initial standards are set, the standards should be designed to prevent any in-
crease in pollution." Id. at 5. See Edwards, Water Quality Standards—Current Policy
Issues, U.S. Dept. of the Interior News Release, June 27, 1968, at 5-7; Moore, Man's
Environment and the Quality of Life, id. May 24, 1968, at 3.
106 This policy interpretation is to be enforced. See Guideline 5(b), which requires
that state standards provide for the "upgrading and enhancement of water quality and
the use or uses of streams or portions thereof that are presently affected by pollution."
Id. at 6 (emphasis added) ; "To meet the goals established by the Act, water quality
standards must be adequate to protect and upgrade water quality in the face of popula-
tion and industrial growth, urbanization, and technological change." Id. at 9 (emphasis
added).
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a regulatory philosophy based on the traditional waste management
purpose of maximizing the use of the waste dilution and assimilation
capacity of the nation's waters.'
From industry's viewpoint, if the water quality policy currently
being promoted by federal authorities is the accepted national policy,
a revolutionary change has been worked in the rules of the waste dis-
posal game. If pollution regulation is now concerned with not just those
diminutions in water quality that are harmful to some other beneficial
use, but with all discharges that degrade the natural quality of the
water, a basic premise of conventional waste management may be
threatened.'" Under universally accepted engineering practices, the
natural self-purification processes of the receiving waters have been
relied upon to carry out the final stages of most waste treatment pro-
cedures.'" This practice is linked to the well-settled riparian principle
that each water user has a right to use the neighboring watercourse for
waste disposal subject only to the limitation that his wastes not unrea-
sonably interfere with other beneficial uses of the water."° Public
regulation has always imposed limitations on the exercise of this right;
however, under the prevalent interpretation of the recent legislation,
Congress apparently has denied the validity of that right, at least in
respect to the use of interstate waters?'
107 For criticism of the "clean as possible" approach represented by the Guidelines,
see Wendell, Intergovernmental Relations in Water Quality Control, in Symposium,
supra note 83, at 15.
108 At the House Hearings in 1967, the following dialogue occurred between Con-
gressman Harsha and Commissioner Quigley:
Mr. Harsha. All right. Now, does the Federal Water Pollution Control
Administration believe that the discharge may be eliminated before clean water
can be attained?
Mr. Quigley. As a theoretical question, I do not think the answer to that
could ever be yes. I think as a practical matter, in many instances, this is the
only way you are going to eliminate the pollution. But I could recognize a
situation where because of the flow, high quality of it, and lack of other dis-
charges, that you would not have to.
1967 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 110-11.
109 See Baumann, Physical, Scientific, and Engineering Aspects of Pollution, in
Water Pollution Control and Abatement 13 (Willrich & Hines S. 1967); Smith, The
Industrial Point of View, in id. at 134.
110 Unreasonable interference has traditionally been judged on nuisance principles.
IV. Prosser, Torts § 90, at 621-23 (3d ed. 1964).
111 See Guidelines, supra note 101, at 5, quoting President Johnson's statement
when signing the 1965 Act into law: "The banks of the rivers may belong to one man
or one industry or one state, but the waters which flow between these banks should
belong to all the people."
The policy implications of the Water Quality Act of 1965 have not gone totally
unnoticed by the courts. In a recent condemnation case in the 4th Circuit, the con-
demnee's claim for damages was based on loss of his riparian right to discharge waste
into the stream. The court held that under state law he had no such legal right and
then mentioned the recent federal legislation "to show that National policy buttresses"
the policy of the state. United States v. 531.13 Acres of Land, 366 F.2d 915, 920 (4th Cir.
1966).
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Without taking sides on industry's resistance to adopting natural
water quality as a national goal, it is possible to be tolerant of ques-
tions addressed to the justification for this degree of "progress." The
supposed new policy in some respects seems to be a reversion to the
ancient common law doctrine of "natural flow."' This principle was
rejected by American courts nearly a century ago on the ground that it
was incompatible with a modern industrial economy?" Social and
economic conditions would seem to have undergone drastic enough
changes in the last hundred years, however, to render a full-circle
return to a "natural flow" policy of water stewardship as at least
defensible.
Additional manifestations of federal intent will be required to test
the reliability of the foregoing analysis of national water quality
policy lls and to assess the degree of commitment to such a policy.'
One thing is clear, however: if the federal government is committed to
move with some speed toward realization of the goal of nationwide
natural water quality, the financial implications of such a program to
industrial waste treatment are truly staggering.
V. MEANS FOR GENERATING INVESTMENT IN POLLUTION CONTROL
Because there is no market in water resources adequate to reflect
society's economic preferences for water use, reliance must be placed
on political-legal mechanisms to assert and protect the public interest
in water. In water quality matters, private remedies available to per-
sons suffering injury from misuse of water have proved ineffective to
protect the public interest in reasonable water use?" Therefore, public
112 "Under this [natural flow] theory the primary or fundamental right of each
riparian proprietor on a watercourse or lake is to have the body of water maintained
in its natural state, not sensibly diminished_ in quantity or impaired in quality." Restate-
ment of Torts, ch. 41, at 342-43 (1939).
113 See Monroe Carp Pond Co. v. River Raisin Paper Co., 240 Mich. 279-388, 215
N.W. 325, 328 (1927) ; Borough of Westville v. Whitney Home Builders, Inc., 40 N.J.
Super. 62, 79-80, 122 A.2d 233, 242 (Super. Ct. 1956); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sander-
son, 113 Pa. 126, 149, 6 A. 453, 459 (1886).
111 FWPCA Commissioner Quigley, in response to the question, "Will there be
a Federal policy on what the investment should be?" responded: "The judgment of
what the Federal policy will be will become evident in the reviewing of the standards
submitted by the States. The Federal government will make a policy decision . . ."
Symposium, supra note 83, at 11.
115 It is at least worthy of note that two of the positions of administrative leader-
ship in the federal pollution program changed hands early in 1968. Max N. Edwards
replaced Frank C. Di Luzio in the post of Ass't Sec. of the Interior for Water Pollution
Control and Joe G. Moore, Jr. succeeded James M. Quigley as Commissioner of the
FWPCA. At this writing it is too early to tell what effect, if any, these changes will
have on the development of the federal water quality program; however, recent speeches
made by both officials seem to demonstrate a determination to continue and extend the
policies developed by their predecessors. See Edwards, supra note 105; Moore, supra
note 105.
116 Public regulation of water quality in no way precludes the bringing of a private
action to recover damages suffered as the result of pollution or to enjoin the pollution.
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regulation of pollution-creating water use activities has become the
principal means of injecting the incentives and constraints so clearly
lacking in the raw economics of industrial waste disposal. Doubts have
been raised, however, whether the effectiveness of public regulation of
pollution has kept pace with the emerging water quality objectives of
society as expressed with increasing clarity at various levels of the
political process. Substantial question also exists whether increased en-
forcement of stricter pollution laws alone is the fairest and most efficient
means of generating the needed investment.
Governmental assistance and incentives to industry and an effluent
charge system are the two approaches currently receiving the most
attention as alternative methods for providing the requisite external
stimulus. The principal areas in which these approaches differ from
enforcement are in the manner of initial allocation of facility Construc-
tion cost, the likely level of economic efficiency attained in waste
treatment, and the time required to put an adequate waste treatment
program in operation. Stronger pollution enforcement, financial mea-
sures and effluent charges are by no means mutually exclusive ap-
proaches to generating the needed investment. Rather, the problem is
one of discovering the most workable combination of the three.
A. Public Regulation
The power to regulate water pollution is possessed and exercised
by specialized agencies in all 50 states, by a handful of interstate
Such suits are still brought with some frequency and often the injured party recovers
damages. O'Brien v. Primm, 243 Ark. 186, 419 S.W.2d 323 (1967) ; Carson v. Hercules
Powder Co., 240 Ark. 887, 402 S.W.2d 640 (1966). Occasionally, the plaintiff is successful
in enjoining the polluting activity. Urie v. Franconia Paper Corp., 107 N.H. 131, 218
A.2d 360 (1966).
Historically, private actions to remedy pollution have not been easily won. Everyone
adversely affected by pollution does not have standing to sue the polluter. Even if the
party does have standing to sue, the burden of proving a case may be awesome. The
defenses open to the polluter are plentiful. Montet v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 135 So. 2d
805 (La. 1961) (failure to prove that damage to rice crop resulted from pollution) ;
City of Henryetta v. Runyan, 370 P.2d 565 (Okla. 1962) (failure to prove damages
adequately); Swango v. County Squire Motel, Inc., 431 P.2d 839 (Ore. 1967) (failure
to prove pollution caused illness of cattle). See generally W. Prosser, Torts § 90 (3d ed.
1964) ; Allison & Mann, The Trial of a Water Pollution Case, 13 Baylor L. Rev. 199
(1961); Note, Rights and Remedies in the Law of Stream Pollution, 35 Va. L. Rev. 774
(1949). A finding that the polluter is responsible for the harm alleged does not assume
that his discharges will be stopped. See Taylor, Control of Stream Pollution, 33 Texas
L. Rev. 370 (1955) ; Note, Statutory Treatment of Industrial Stream Pollution, 24
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 302 (1956),
A more basic difficulty in relying on private actions to regulate industrial pollution
effectively is that our adversary system is not conducive to that goal. In a private
action between two parties, it is very difficult to obtain adequate representation of the
public interest. Courts are generally not well suited to perform the function required
for effective pollution control. For a discussion of this point in some detail, see Hines,
Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, Part I: State Pollution
Control Programs, 52 Iowa L. Rev. 186, 196-201 (1966).
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agencies and by the federal government. Although for some years
public regulation has been the prevalent means of attempting to extract
from industry improved performances in waste treatment, coercive
measures have not been the norm. In theory, a cease-and-desist order
from a public water pollution control agency can put an industry to
the choice of cleaning up or closing up. In practice, however, there
are few cases on record of an industry having closed up because of
noncompliance with a pollution abatement order. Current federal and
interstate pollution control programs are not well designed to utilize
coercive enforcement techniques. At the state and local level the
potential for meaningful enforcement has long existed, but only now
is it being realized.
To date, at all of the regulatory levels, water quality control has
been primarily a crisis-solving operation. The typical agency has re-
sponded to complaints of localized damage from pollution conditions,
but has not carried out a comprehensive preventive program of moni-
toring and maintaining surveillance of the quality of all waters subject
to regulation. It is anticipated that the establishment of water quality
standards will mark the opening of a new phase of water pollution
control and that day-to-day supervision and management of water
quality will become the standard practice among local pollution control
agencies.
1. Federal Enforcement.—Because enforcement of pollution control
laws generally is conceded to be a function of local and state govern-
ments,' the federal enforcement power was originally intended to
deal only with situations in which jurisdictional limitations frustrated
the pollution control efforts of local agencies.'" This potential exists
wherever pollution conditions affect more than one state, either because
the polluted water runs from one state to another, or because the water
forms the border between the states. The federal enforcement ma-
chinery was designed to provide a means of coordinating the pollution
control efforts of state agencies facing a common problem over which
no state had complete jurisdiction. Although the scope of the federal
enforcement power has been substantially enlarged over the years, the
117 "Consistent with the policy declaration of this act, state and interstate action
to abate pollution of interstate or navigable waters shall be encouraged and shall not,
except as otherwise provided by or pursuant to court order under subsection (g) of this
section, be displaced by Federal enforcement action." Control Act, supra note 81,
§ 466g(b) (Supp. II 1965-66).
118 Water Pollution Control Act § 2, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948). See Hearings on S. 890
and S. 928 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 45-47 (1955) ; Note, Statutory Stream Pollution Control, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev.
225, 238 (1951).
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enforcement procedures still retain the conciliatory character consis-
tent with the original, more limited purpose."
The FWPCA's enforcement jurisdiction extends to all navigable
and interstate waters in the nation, including coastal waters and tribu-
taries of interstate streams.12° Federal enforcement may also be in-
voked in situations where pollution has international effects.'" Federal
authority to initiate enforcement actions is limited to situations where
pollution in one state endangers the health or welfare of persons in
another state.' Where the pollution source and all of its effects are
confined to the territorial limits of a single state, the federal enforce-
ment powers may be invoked only at the express request of the state.'
In situations of international pollution, enforcement action must be
requested by the Secretary of State.
The federal enforcement procedure consists of three stages: a
conference with state and interstate agencies,'" a public hearing
before a board appointed by the Secretary of Interior,' and federal
court action instituted by the Attorney General at the request of the
Secretary. Where the pollution's causes and effects occur wholly within
one state, the written consent of the state Governor is required before
119 For the development of the federal enforcement powers, see Hines, supra note
87, at 809-38.
129 Control Act, supra note 81, § 466g(a). For a discussion of the liberal definition
applied to "navigable waters" under federal law, see Hearings on S. 649, S. 737, S. 1118
and S. 1183 Before a Special Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm.
on Public Works, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 50-51 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 Senate
Hearings] (testimony of Murray Stein, Public Health Service Enforcement Officer).
121 Control Act, supra note 81, § 466g(d) (2) (Supp. 11 1965-66).
122 Id. § 466g(d) (1). Also, if it is found that pollution is causing a substantial
economic injury due to an inability to market shellfish or shellfish products in interstate
commerce, the federal agency may initiate an enforcement action. Id.
123 Id. The request may come from either the governor of the state or the state
water pollution control agency, or the governing body of any municipality in the state, if
the governor and the state water pollution control agency for the state concur in the
request. Id.
124 Id. §§ 466g(d) (1)-(4).
125 Id. §§ 466g(e), (f). The public hearing is called by the Secretary of the Interior
no sooner than six months after the date that he has specifically recommended to the
appropriate state water pollution control agencies that they take necessary remedial
action. The procedure set forth in the Act regarding the public hearing is fairly compli-
cated. It is specifically provided that the hearing board be made up of a group of five
or more persons appointed by the Secretary not less than a majority of whom must be
persons other than officers or employees of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare. A new reporting provision was added at the hearing stage by the Clean Water
Restoration Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 1246. The Secretary may now require any person
whose alleged activities result in pollution to file a report based on existing data fur-
nishing such information as may be reasonably required as to the character, kind, and
quantity of such discharges and the use of facilities of other means to prevent or reduce
such discharges by the party filing the report. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(f) (2) (Supp. II 1965-66).
This provision was added to the Act as a result of difficulties experienced in obtaining
production and waste treatment information from industry in the enforcement process.
1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 442 (testimony of Murray Stein, Chief, Enforce-
ment Program, FWPCA).
578
INDUSTRIAL WATER POLLUTION
a federal abatement suit may be instituted.'" Each succeeding step of
the enforcement procedure is pursued only if satisfactory progress is
not achieved under the previous step. It is at the conference stage that
the major portion of the federal effort has been expended thus far. In
the 42 instances in which federal enforcement action has been
instituted through April, 1968, only three have proceeded beyond the
conference lever'? and in only one of these cases was court action
necessary. 128
The federal strategy in the enforcement conference has been first
to produce a detailed and complete analysis of the pollution situation
under study, including the precise character of the damage and the
sources of contributing pollutants. The notion is that once the facts of
the case are marshalled and proved to the satisfaction of the affected
parties, the commitment to take remedial steps becomes relatively easy
to obtain.'" Second, every person alleged to be contributing to the
pollution or affected by it is afforded an opportunity to present a full
statement of his views. 130 Third, after all of the information has been
submitted, the conferees jointly study it, assessing the seriousness of
the pollution situation, identifying and ordering the problems requiring
solution, and evaluating the effects of existing local control programs.
Finally, an attempt is made to agree on the remedial steps necessary
to eliminate the pollution and to establish a timetable to carry out the
corrective measures.'"' Almost all of the conference settlements rep-
resent the unanimous agreement of the conferees and the concurrence
of the municipalities and industries involved. 132 Surveillance of the
situation is maintained after the adjournment of the conference, and
if new problems develop or the schedule for corrective action is not
met, the conference is reconvened.'" In recent conferences cooperation
between industry, municipalities and the public regulatory agencies
has been clearly evident—a far cry from the situation that obtained
126 Control Act, supra note 81, 4 466g(g) (Supp. II 1965-66). As will be discussed
later, this consent requirement limits federal enforcement of water quality standards.
127 Program, supra note 5, at 24-29. The enforcement actions have involved 40
states and the District of Columbia. Id. at 22.
128 This action was filed against the city of St. Joseph, Missouri, in the federal
district court at St. Joseph on September 29, 1960. A court order was issued on October
.31, 1961. See 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 444.
129 1967 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 101.
no Control Act, supra note 81, 	 466g(d) (3) (Supp. II 1965-66). Apparently a
written statement is contemplated. 1 CCH Water Control News, No. 23, at 25 (Oct. 24,
1966) (Comment on 466g(d) (3)).
131 See 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 441. Once an acceptable remedial
course has been established, 'the federal purpose is to disengage from the enforcement
procedures as rapidly as possible, [and] allow the State and the localities to handle that
themselves...." 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 120, at 49.
132 1967 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 101.
133 In a number of cases two or more conference sessions have been held, and in one
case five sessions have been called. 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 443-48.
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only a few years ago.'" Although the procedure admittedly derives
most of its force from the "Court of Public Opinion,'"185 the conference
device has proved a relatively effective catalyst for meaningful action
to upgrade water quality?'
2. Interstate Enforcement.--There is very little to be reported con-
cerning the enforcement programs of interstate agencies for the simple
reason that there has been very little interstate enforcement activity!"
The Ohio River Basin Sanitation Commission (ORSANCO),' 38 the
Delaware Basin Commission's° and the Interstate Sanitation Commis-
134 At one point in an earlier investigation, federal agents were forced to use boats
to obtain information about the waste discharge of an industry which refused to release
any data about its processes. 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 449.
135 See FWPCA Commissioner Quigley's comments on this facet of federal enforce-
ment. Industrial Water Pollution Control, in Mill and Factory 48 (Nov. 1966).
130 Of the 37 enforcement conferences, 22 were initiated by the federal agency, 11
at the request of the states, and 4 on the basis of joint, state-federal initiative. No
exercise has yet been made of the jurisdiction over international waters granted by the
1966 Act. Federal enforcement actions have involved over 1000 municipalities, in excess
of 1200 industries and have covered over 7000 miles of streams and rivers. 1966 Senate
Hearings, supra note 4, at 440-50.
The success of the conciliatory approach has not been total, but Congress has been
unwilling to unleash federal enforcement authority in any substantial manner, although
frequently petitioned to do so. The proposals of the Johnson Administration in the
Clean Rivers Restoration legislation of 1966 would have substantially strengthened the
federal enforcement arm. Those proposals were:
(I) An emergency power in the federal agency to abate pollution in inter-
state or navigable waters where an imminent danger to public health is
posed.
(2) To extend the application of federal water quality standards to navigable
waters and to authorize federal initiative of enforcement proceedings in
intrastate pollution cases.
(3) To eliminate the two six-month waiting periods.
(4) To grant the Secretary power to issue subpoenas to compel attendance of
witnesses at hearings.
(5) To require registration of all facilities that constitute existing or potential
sources of pollution.
(6) To give representatives of the federal agency the right to inspect business
operations that may be pollution sources, actually or potentially.
(7) To authorize suit in federal district courts by any person seeking relief
from pollution.
(8) To remove the de novo review of the findings and recommendations of
Hearing Boards by the federal courts and substitute a review on the record.
See S. 2947, H.R. 13104, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). For the case arguing these changes,
see 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 106-29 (statements of Secretary . Udall and
Mr. James Quigley), 434-43 (statement of Mr. Murray Stein).
137 For a discussion of the regulation of water quality by interstate agencies, see
generally E. Cleary, The ORSANCO Story (1967); McKinley, The Management of Water
Resources under the American Federal System, in Federalism Mature and Emergent 328
(MacMahon ed. 1955); G. Hart, Creative Federalism: Recent Trends in Regional Water
Resources Planning and Development, 39 Colo. L. Rev. 29 (1966); R. Leach, The
Federal Government and Interstate Compacts, 29 Fordham L. Rev. 421 (1961); Zimmer-
man & Wendell, New Horizons on the Delaware, 36 State Gov't 157 (1963).
138 Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, Art. IV, 54 Stat. 752 (1940).
199 Delaware River Basin Compact, Art. 2, § 2.1, 75 Stat. 691 (1961).
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sion (ISC) 140 possess the power to issue abatement orders and pursue
court enforcement against delinquents."' ORSANCO and ISC have
both issued a number of compliance orders?' but only ISC has had
any experience venturing into state courts to secure enforcements and
generally it has been successful in making its orders stand up in
court.'"
By and large, however, the long-standing policy of both
ORSANCO and ISC and the other newer interstate agencies con-
cerned with pollution control has been to prefer education and informal
persuasion to enforcement in attacking their water quality problems."'
Considering the unique political position of the interstate agency, this
approach is understandable, but serious doubts have been raised con-
cerning the meaningfulness of the gains cited to prove the success of
these "soft-sell" tactics."' The future of the interstate agency in
regional water quality regulation is somewhat uncertain at the moment,
although every sign seems to point toward greater reliance on regional
institutions in water resource management.'"
3. State and Local Enforcement.—Never in the history of water
quality management has there been such a ferment as is now occurring
in state and local pollution control programs.'" Nearly every state
has substantially reformed its antipollution laws in the last decade:
many have overhauled their statutes in the last two years?" A good
140 Tri-State Compact, Art. IV, 49 Stat. 932 (1935).
141 Art. IX, 54 Stat. at 755 (ORSANCO) ; Art. V, 75 Stat. at 696-97 (Del.) ; Art.
IX, 49 Stat. at 936 (ISC). The Tennessee River Basin Water Pollution Control Compact
also grants enforcement powers but the Compact commission apparently has not
evolved to an active level thus far. See Art. VIII, 72 Stat. 823 (1958).
142 See E. Cleary, supra note 137, at 117-22.
145 See 1965 Interstate Sanitation Comm'n Rep. 31-33.
144 "The theme [of ORSANCOl has been: Persuasion if possible, but compulsion
where necessary." 1963 Senate Hearings, supra note 120, at 238.
145 See F. Graham, Disaster by Default 217-18 (1966) ; R. Leach & R. Sugg, The
Administration of Interstate Compacts 185-87 (1959).
146 The FWPCA is pushing ahead with its efforts to prepare comprehensive river
basin planning studies and to encourage the formation of river basin planning agencies.
2 CCH Water Control News, No. 18, at 9 (Sept. 18, 1967) ; id. No. 6, at 1 (June 26,
1967).
The Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966 boosted the utilization of river basin
planning agencies by making available a special 50% program grant to state or inter-
state agencies developing comprehensive water quality programs on a river basin basis.
33 U.S.C. § 466a(c) (1) (Supp. II 1965-66).
147 (Ms I think most of the members of this committee know, water pollu-
tion has been front page news all across the country, at the State level and local
level. Hearings that are held by State water pollution officials are not news.
You will not read about them in the Washington press; but they are very
important news and there has been a tremendous ferment at the State level
and it is there today because the State agencies have been holding hearings
across the States and this has generated a tremendous interest and enthusiasm.
1967 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 28 (remarks of Secretary Udall).
145 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 36-1851 to -1868 (Supp. 1967); Cal. Water
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portion of the current activity is attributable to the standard-setting
requirement of the 1965 federal legislation, but much of the current
planning and enforcement activity had its seeds in a general upgrading
of state water quality programs in response to local antipollution pres-
sures.149 Many local control agencies now seem ready to follow the
enforcement example of states like Pennsylvania which has launched
a concerted drive to bring to court industries and municipalities delin-
quent in their response to pollution abatement orders.'5° This represents
a marked change in the character of local pollution control as it existed
only a few years ago.'
Until the recent adoption of water quality standards, the state
determination of the existence of a pollution situation requiring abate-
ment was generally done on an ad hoc basis.'" Under the old state
procedures, ordinarily a complaint was necessary to set the enforce-
ment machinery in motion. This requirement itself proved a boon to
pollution because it usually meant no remedial action would be taken
until the pollution condition became sufficiently severe to cause harm.
When a complaint was received, the alleged pollution situation was in-
vestigated and a determination made whether the pollution complained
of was unlawful, who was responsible, and what, if anything, should
be done about it.' Under all state acts the alleged polluter is entitled
to a hearing on these issues.'"
Code §§ 120-39 (West Supp. 1967); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-19 to -23 (Supp.
1966); Fla. Stat. Ann. H 403.011-.261 (Supp. 1968); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 17-501 to -530
(Supp. 1967) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 19, §§ 145.2-6, .16-.17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967) ; Kan.
Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 65-165 to -171 (Supp. 1967) ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 146.010-.110
(Supp. 1967) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 21, H 26-50 (Supp. 1968) ; Minn. Stat. Ann.
§§ 116.01-.09 (Supp. 1967); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 7106-111 to -136 (Supp. 1967);
N.H. Rev. Stat. §§ 149:1 to :8-a (Supp., 1967) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. H 75-39-1 to -12
(1968) ; NE. Gen. Stat. §§ 143-211 to -215.10 (Supp. 1967) ; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 6111.01-40 (Baldwin Supp. 1967) ; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 7621d-1 (Supp. 1967);
Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-14-2.5 to -3 (Supp. 1967) ; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 901-51
(Supp. 1967); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 90.48.-L1 to .413 (Supp. 1967); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§1144.01-57 (Supp. 1967).
140 See Carmichael, Forty Years of Water Pollution Control in Wisconsin: A Case
Study, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 350.
150 See 1 CCH Water Control News, No. 29, at 7-8 (Dec. 5, 1966) (Pa. board
threatened legal action against paper company if it violated order to abate pollution)
2 id. No. 26, at 10 (Nov. 13, 1967) (Pa. five-year plan approved by FWPCA); 2 id.
No. 35, at 5 (Jan. 15, 1968) (failure to obtain discharge permit closes Pa. coal mine).
For examples of other state activities, see 1 id. No. 27, at 4 (Nov. 21, 1966) (Mich.
reports on water pollution control activities) ; 2 id. No. 13, at 17 (Aug. 14, 1967)
(pollution penalty sought against III, coal firm) ; 2 id. No. 27, at 8 (Nov. 20, 1967)
(antipollution orders in N.J.).
151 See E. Murphy, Water Purity 68-69 (1961) ; Hines, supra note 116, at 215-34.
152 Wilson, Legal Aspects of Water Pollution Control, Proceedings, The National
Conference on Water Pollution 354, 365 (1960).
153 Stein, Problems and Programs in Water Pollution, 2 Natural Resources J. 388,
404-06 (1962); Wilson, supra note 152, at 371-74. See United States Department of the
Interior, Suggested State Water Pollution Control Act, Revised, § 7 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as Suggested State Act].
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Armed with only the statutory definition as a measuring stick, the
pollution control agency frequently became involved in extended argu-
ments with alleged polluters over whether or not the condition in issue
constituted pollution' and whether an abatement order was justified
under all of the circumstances of the case." Once it was determined
that a particular waste discharge practice constituted pollution and
warranted abatement, an order was issued directing corrective meas-
ures. If the order was not complied with, criminal penalties could be
invoked"' and injunctive relief was usually available.'
Besides its inherent slowness, another serious problem with this
common law approach was that it tended to retard planning measures
designed to prevent pollution. The occasional waste discharger, who
was anxious to avoid the label of polluter, could never be quite sure
what level of performance was required. Despite an honest effort on
the part of the control agency to treat similar cases alike, every case
seemed to be unique. Many states use a waste discharge permit system
to control pollution from new installations ; 15° however, this has not
proved to be a completely satisfactory preventive measure and, of
course, it has no effect on existing pollution sources.
In summary, without some sort of unifying program guidelines,
154 See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 17-512 (Supp. 1967); Iowa Code Ann. § 455B.15
(Supp. 1968); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 111, § 162 (1966).
155 Statutory definitions are often either too vague to be useful or so all encompass-
ing as to raise arguments over the practicality of enforcing them to the letter of the law.
For example, the Water Pollution Control Act does not define the pollution subjected to
federal regulation except to require that it "endangers the health or welfare of any
persons." Control Act, supra note 81, § 466g(a). Most modern state antipollution laws
contain detailed definitions similar to that offered in the recently revised Suggested
State Water Pollution Control Act:
"Pollution" means such contamination, or other alteration of the physical,
chemical or biological properties, of any waters of the State, including change
in temperature, taste, color, turbidity, or odor of the waters, or such discharge
of any liquid, gaseous, solid, radioactive, or other substance into any waters of
the State as will or is likely to create a nuisance or render such waters harm-
ful, detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare, or to domestic,
commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational, or other legitimate beneficial
uses, or to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or other aquatic life.
Suggested State Act, supra note 153, § 2(a).
155 Under state pollution control as it was practiced until very recently, orders
were issued cautiously and enforced reluctantly. See Hines, supra note 116, at 227-30.
157 Suggested State Act, supra note 153, § 10. See, e.g., Cal. Water Code § 13055.1
(West Supp. 1967) ; Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-203 (1955); W. Va. Code Ann. § 20-5A-19
(Supp. 1967).
158 See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 17-521 (Supp. 1967) ; Md. Ann. Code art. 96A, § 20
(1964); Suggested State Act, supra note 153, § 10.
159 See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 17-510(2) (Supp. 1967); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 115.07
(1964); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 69-1332 (1947) ; Suggested State Act, supra note
153, § 5(b).
A separate penalty section for violation of the permit requirement is often included
to add teeth to this type of regulation. See Mich. Stat. Ann. § 3.533(15) (1961) ; S.C.
Code Ann. § 70-117 (Supp. 1967).
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state enforcement has tended to be haphazard and prevention efforts
by would-be polluters, highly conjectural. The general lack of success
in pollution control under the ad hoc approach made clear the need
for some type of common denominator in evaluating water quality.
4. The Standards Approach to Water Quality Regulation.—The water
quality standards presently being adopted around the country repre-
sent an effort to bring some rationality and consistency to water quality
regulation. Standards are water quality norms established for specific
waters based on the present and future uses to be made of the waters
and expressed, either descriptively or scientifically, in terms of the
accepted quality parameters required for the designated uses. A num-
ber of state and interstate agencies have utilized water quality standards
in their pollution control program for some years; ] ' however, not all
of the early state experience with standards was successful from the
standpoint of improving water quality. 161 The Water Quality Act of
1965, by requiring the creation of water quality standards to be used
in regulating pollution and enhancing water quality in all of the
nation's interstate waters,'" provided significant impetus to the setting
of meaningful state standards.'" Although one of the principal justifi-
100 See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 361 (1964) ; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 149.3 (1964) ; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 3614 (1967).
161 Advocates of water quality improvement claim that in several instances the
setting of standards was used as an excuse for not instituting vigorous enforcement
actions or the standards that were set tended to lock in low water quality and retard
quality improvement. Hearing on S. 4 Before a Special Subcomm. on Air and Water
Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1965).
162 It should be noted that the standards requirement relates only to interstate
waters and does not extend to the federal jurisdiction over navigable waters. The Ad-
ministration proposal to enlarge the scope of the standards was rejected in 1966. See
discussion note 136 supra. Interstate waters are defined in the federal guidelines to
include "all rivers, lakes, and other waters that flow across or form a part of State
boundaries, including coastal waters." Guidelines, supra note 101, at 10.
Several reasons have been cited for the restriction of standards to interstate waters,
among them the notion that there may be a jurisdictional question whether the federal
government can regulate water quality on navigable waters. Wendell, Intergovernmental
Relations In Water Quality Control, in Symposium, supra note 83, at 13-16.
162 Two distinct patterns developed in the establishment of standards prior to the
1965 Act. Under so-called "effluent standards," quality requirements were expressed in
either the character of the effluent that may be discharged (strength or volume) or the
degree of treatment that must be applied to the effluent before discharge. See, e.g., Md.
Ann. Code art. 96A, § 23 (1957) (Commission to recommend standards for sewage or
waste effluents discharged) ; Miss. Code Ann. § 5929-04 (1955) (Commission to set
standards for purity of effluent). Under the more prevalent "receiving water" standards,
the required quality was described in terms of the waters into which waste discharges
are made. See, e.g., Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 69-1330(e) (1947) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
82, § 906(f) (Supp. 1967) ; S.C. Code Ann. § 70-109 (1962).
The difference between these two approaches is not as great as might appear. If
both types of standards are established under procedures designed to implement a com-
prehensive water quality program based on use classification, the effluent standard should
represent a useful extrapolation from the receiving water standard, a calculation that
otherwise must be made by the individual waste discharger. See Kneese, The Economics
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cations for nationwide standards was to relieve local control agencies
from the threat that vigorous enforcement might drive off industry,
it was not anticipated that a single set of national standards would be
created. The expectation of Congress was that both establishment and
enforcement of the standards would be primarily a local responsi-
bility!"
The states were given the initial opportunity to formulate the
standards to be applied to interstate waters within or bordering the
states?" If the state does not act, or if the adopted state standards
are not acceptable to the federal authorities,'" the Secretary of the In-
terior is authorized to promulgate standards. The power of the Secretary
to establish standards himself is limited by a maze of procedural
requirements; 10 ' however, the effect of requiring his approval of
standards submitted by the states vests him with enormous practical
control over the standard-establishing process.'" Regardless of who
ultimately asserts responsibility for their adoption/" water quality
standards will soon be in force for all of the nation's interstate rivers,
lakes and coastal waters.
The water quality standards required under the Water Quality
Act of 1965 involve three essential components: First, a determination
of Regional Water Quality Management 82-85 (1964). As practiced, however, effluent
standards have tended to be crude expressions of the minimal quality of discharge
generally acceptable from different pollution sources. Staff Report, supra note 6, at
79-82.
164 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3313, 3321 (1965).
165 Control Act, supra note 81, § 466g(c) (1) (Supp. II 1965-66). A jurisdictional
question has been raised concerning rivers that originate in a state and flow into the
ocean. Are these interstate waters for purposes of the standards requirements? The
position of the FWPCA is that interstate waters include coastal waters in estuarian areas
and bays and also include rivers that run into the ocean to the extent they are in-
fluenced by tide action. Guidelines, supra note 101, at 10; 1966 Senate Hearings, supra
note 4, at 436 -37, 440 -41.
166 The states were given until July 1, 1967, to establish standards and to file them
with the Secretary of the Interior. To assist the states in establishing water quality
standards in compliance with the federal act, the Secretary issued the Guidelines in May,
1966, and later followed this release with a statement outlining the materials that should
be included in the presentation of the state's standards and plans to the Secretary for
his review. Guidelines, supra note 101; 1 CCH Water Control News, No. 33, at 1
(Jan. 3, 1967); id. No. 39, at 1 (Feb. 13, 1967).
167 Control Act, supra note 81, §§ 466g(c) (2), (4) (Supp. I 1965).
Ica This substantial power in the Secretary caused considerable debate during
Congress' consideration of the water quality standards issue in 1964-65. See S. Rep. No.
10, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-17 (1965). The argument that finally carried the day was
that if the federal agency did not have substantial powers in the area of reviewing state
standards, the objective of consistent nationwide standards could not be fulfilled. Hear-
ing on S. 4, supra note 161, at 40-41, 43-44, 49-50, 78 -98; Hearings on H.R. 3988,
S. 4, and Related Bills Before the House Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
191 -93 (1965).
169 The Secretary has stated that, although he does not cherish the responsibility
for setting standards, he stands ready to do the job if the states do not adequately
shoulder the responsibility. See 1967 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 32.
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is made concerning the present and future uses to be made of each
body or stretch of interstate water. Public hearings are required as a
part of the decision-making process regarding 'use designations."°
Second, the specific water quality characteristics allowed or required
for such uses must be identified and descriptive or numerical values
established for each of them.'" These so-called water quality criteria
include such matters as dissolved oxygen, temperature, chlorides,
phenols, alkalinity, salinity, alkalinity-acidity balance, hardness, num-
ber of coliforms, sedimentation, and suspended solids or turbidity."'
The establishment of such criteria in relation to every reach of inter-
state waters provides a ready measure for evaluating the quality of
these waters. The third component of the standards is a precise, de-
tailed plan for achieving and preserving the criteria established, in-
cluding such ingredients as preventive steps, construction schedules,
enforcement actions, surveillance and monitoring?'"
All SO states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and the District of
Columbia have filed water quality standards for the interstate waters
within or bordering the state. At this writing, 28 of the state standards
had been approved in whole or in part."' The FWPCA is in the process
of reviewing the standards of the other states and indications are that
approvals will soon be granted at an accelerated rate."' Presumably,
170 Control Act, supra note 81, § 466g(f) (1) (Supp. II 1965-66). The states were
advised to make as good a bearing record as possible, including a wide representation of
interest groups. Guidelines, supra note 101, at 8-9. Apparently, some of the early
hearings tended to be one-sided with conservation groups dominating the testimony.
Symposium, supra note 83, at 9 (remarks of Commissioner Quigley).
171 In February 1967, Secretary Udall appointed five national technical advisory
committees to recommend scientific bases for evaluating the adequacy of the water
quality standards submitted by the states. The five areas in which the committees'
advice was sought were: (1) agriculture; (2) recreation and aesthetics; (3) industrial
water supplies; (4) public water supplies; and (5) fish, other aquatic life and wild life.
These committees filed a comprehensive interim report with the Secretary on June 30,
1967, and that report has been utilized in evaluating the state standards. 2 CCH Water
Control News, No. 10, at 5-10 (July 24, 1967).
172 For example, under the New York standards, which have been approved, Class
AA waters are specified for use as water supply for drinking, culinary or food processing
purposes and any other uses. These waters must be free of floating or settleable solids,
oil, taste or odor producing substances, sewage or waste effluents. They must have a pH
range between 6.5 and 8.5 and no less than 4.0 parts per million of dissolved oxygen.
They must contain no toxic wastes, deleterious substances, colored or other wastes—
including heat—that would be injurious to fish life or impair the waters for other
best usage. New York Codes, Rules and Regulations, tit. 6, part 701.3.
173 Guidelines, supra note 101, at 7.
174 2 CCH Water Control News, No. 47, at 2 (April 8, 1968).
175 The FWPCA indicated in midsummer of 1967 that it was expected that most
of the state standards would be acted upon by the end of the year. Id. No. 10, at 3-5
(July 24, 1967).
Several reasons exist for the slowness with which the standards are being approved.
The sheer volume of the work is one factor. See 1967 House Hearings, supra note 17,
at 85. There has apparently been some difficulty in some state standards concerning
the degree to which secondary treatment of wastes is required by the standards. See 2
586
INDUSTRIAL WATER POLLUTION
enforcement of the standards will begin as soon as they become final;
however, it should be noted that many of the interstate waters where
pollution is most critical are already involved in federal enforcement
proceedings.'"
The merit of the water quality standards approach to pollution
control has been and continues to be a controversial subject. Ten years
of congressional debater?" preceded the passage of the standards pro-
gram included in the Water Quality Act of 1965 and discussions about
implementation and development of the program have continued ever
since the Act was signed.'" Adoption of water quality standards has
also been a long-standing issue in many states.'" The federal require-
ment of standards for interstate waters has now served to rekindle this
debate in relation to the establishment of parallel state standards for
intrastate waters.
Most of the pollution control advantages to be gained through
water quality standards have already been mentioned. Comprehensive
standards promote consistency in antipollution enforcement, permit
meaningful surveillance of water quality to detect and control pollu-
tion before harm occurs, serve as guidelines for the institution of
pollution preventive measures, and form the basis for planning water
quality improvement on a "problemshed" basis. Many of the alleged
disadvantages result not from deficiencies in the theory of using stan-
dards to regulate water quality, but from real and imagined problems
in putting the theory into operation.' The objectives and operational
requirements developed for the current federal standards program go
far in ameliorating the less serious of the conventional objections to
standards."'
CCH Water Control News, supra at 1. In addition, temperature criteria have caused some
concern. Id. No. 14, at 1 (Aug. 21, 1967).
1" One of the requirements in setting the state standards was that the standards
must conform to the water quality "requirements" and the time schedules worked out in
the various federal enforcement proceedings. See Guidelines, supra note 101, at 4, 9.
171 See generally Hearings on S. 890 and S. 928 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Public Works, 84th Cong., 1st Sess (1955).
178 See, e.g., 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 104, 1386, 442; 1967 House Hear-
ings, supra note 17, at 85-103.
179 See Wilson, supra note 152, at 364-69.
180 One indication that standards may represent a reasonable approach to water
quality management is the fact that they have been opposed by both industry and
conservationists—on different grounds, of course. See Hearing on S. 4, supra note 161,
at 39, 74 (statements of Mr. A. J. vonFrank of the Manufacturing Chemists Ass'n and
Mr. Louis S. Clapper of the National Wildlife Fed in).
181 Three objections frequently aired are (1) that the setting of standards has been
used as an excuse to delay enforcement; (2) that standards are not justifiable at this time
because the state of water quality knowledge is not sufficient to permit informed decision
making; (3) that standards setting is such potent political power it should not be
entrusted to an administrative agency of such limited vision as the typical state pollu-
tion board. The first objection seems effectively destroyed in relation to the federal
program by the July 1, 1967, deadline Congress placed on the submission of state
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The theme that consistently runs through criticism of the "stan-
dards" approach by conservation interests is the fear that standards
will initially be set too low and then will be so difficult to change that
they will in effect create licenses to pollute!' This concern is not
without substance. As a practical matter, because quality standards are
usually forged in the heat of controversy, it can be expected that they
often represent a compromise between water completely suitable for all
reasonable uses and manifest pollution. It is also undoubtedly true
that it will be appreciably more difficult to change the standard in
order to correct a recognized water quality deficiency than to remedy
the problem in an ad hoc fashion. Further, human nature is such that
polluters tend to translate minimal water quality requirements into
maximum waste treatment objectives. Thus, standards may reduce in-
centives for quality improvement. These difficulties were obviously
anticipated in the preparation of the guidelines setting forth standards
requirements for the federal program. Considerable effort was devoted
to communicating the idea that, to be acceptable, the state standards
must be designed not only to preserve but to enhance the quality of
the waters regulated.'" Express provision must be made for periodic
review and upgrading of the standards.184
Although amendment of a standard will be more difficult than ad
hoc abatement of an unwanted waste discharge, enforcement efficiency
is so greatly abetted by the adoption of standards that on balance this
possible disparity seems of little consequence. In the designation of
uses under the federal guidelines, specific provision must be made for
"potential and future 'water uses as well as the present intended use
and uses!' If this instruction is conscientiously followed few sit-
standards. The second complaint is a standard argument against undertaking any new
venture. While it is true that extensive research is needed, enough would seem to be
known about water quality to permit establishment of a workable standards program.
The federal guidelines contemplate revision of standards as technology increases. Guide-
lines, supra note 101, at 9-10. The third point raises a sensitive issue. Through water
standards, regions of a state may effectively be zoned against certain types of economic
development. The question is whether these decisions should be made by water quality
experts or by the state legislature. The federal standards program provides for public
hearings in the designation of water uses and requires that a substantial record be made
to support the use designations. Id. at 7-8. Legislative classification of waters is the
norm in several states and is certainly permissible under the guidelines.
182 See F. Graham, Disaster by Default 189 (1966) ; Wilson, supra note 179, at
365-66. A "vested right" to pollute is a shadow that seems to frighten many foes of
standards. Id. at 366-67; Heath, The Legal Implications of Water Quality Standards,
in Symposium, supra note 83, at 52-53. It is difficult to understand how correctly
administered standards could ever create such a right. See 1965 Senate Hearings, supra
note 34, pt. 2, at 648 (remarks of Senator Muskie).
188 Guidelines, supra note 101, at 2.
184 Id. at 9-10.
185 Id. at 6.
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uations should arise where immediate change in the standards is re-
quired to protect water quality."
The matter of potential regulatory difficulties in responding effec-
tively to changes in water quality suggests another troublesome prob-
lem frequently cited by critics of the standards approach. Under the
standards, how does the control agency handle the case of a new indus-
try whose potential waste discharge would lower the receiving waters
below the required quality level? Assuming that the new discharge would
not reduce quality below the standard except that the existing water users
were already using the waste dilution capacity close to the allowable
limit, the question for the state agency is should it refuse to allow the
new industry to discharge any wastes or should the other waste dis-
chargers be required to improve their treatment practices. In the past,
the latter solution has been the norm, with the undesirable result that
water quality frequently suffered while the necessary improvements
were effected by the existing users.' 87 Under the federal requirements
the states are expected to plan for future uses in setting standards.'"
However, unanticipated uses are certain to arise. If, under the federal
standards program, a new user is in effect required to refrain entirely
from discharging wastes into the waters, existing users are being
granted a waste disposal priority. This may be sound policy, but its
overall effect on the community should be carefully evaluated when
this issue comes up for decision by the local agency.
Federal enforcement of the water quality standards raises several
important questions. One curious aspect of the quality standards pro-
gram is that in some situations the federal government's power to
require the establishment of standards is not coextensive with its
authority to enforce the standards established. This situation is
caused by the fact that the 1965 Act, while extending the federal power
to enforce violations of water quality standards' and establishing a
special provision relating to the notice period,' did not alter the
balance of the enforcement procedure. Thus, the FWPCA can move
immediately in cases of water quality violations that are interstate in
character, but cannot commence enforcement action against standards
violators where the violation and the damage caused occur wholly
186 It has been suggested that a "safety factor" should be built into the standards.
See I CCH Water Control News, No. 27, at 5 (Nov. 21, 1966).
187 See Rambow & Sylvester, Methodology in Establishing Water Quality Standards,
39 Water Pollution Control Fed'n J. 1155 (1967), where it is argued that this problem
could be Substantially avoided through setting very high standards.
188 Guidelines, supra note 101, at 6-7.
189 Control Act, supra note 81, § 466g(c) (5) (Supp. II 1965-66).
190 Id. The conference and hearing steps of the enforcement procedure are short
circuited, along with their two 6-month waiting periods. In their place is substituted a
180-day notice period. After the expiration of the notice period, the Secretary may
proceed directly with an abatement action in the courts. Id.
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within the boundaries of one state unless requested to proceed by the
state. Furthermore, where a standards violation is intrastate in nature
and the state invites the FWPCA to act, the FWPCA's power to seek
court enforcement of its orders is conditioned on the consent of the
local governor."'
These minor dislocations in enforcement authority probably will
not cause serious problems in implementing the water quality stan-
dards program for two reasons. First, it is not anticipated that the
federal enforcement machinery will be extensively utilized in enforc-
ing the standards. The basic aim underlying the federal standards pro-
gram is to elevate and accelerate local pollution control activity simulta-
neously. To qualify their standards for the Secretary's approval, the
states must submit a satisfactory control and enforcement plan includ-
ing evidence of their capacity to carry out the plan.192 In short, the
state standards are designed to be self-executing. Therefore, a defi-
ciency in federal enforcement jurisdiction should not retard accom-
plishment of the objectives of the standards program.
A second reason that the federal enforcement power is not crucial
is that the standards are not intended to serve primarily enforcement
purposes."' Standards are certainly important to effective enforce-
ment, but their major value lies in their use in controlling and pre-
venting pollution. Once responsible standards are adopted, the door
is opened to a great variety of meaningful planning and preventive
activities: Relevant surveillance systems can be developed; the speci-
fications for new waste treatment facilities rationally evaluated; criti-
cal path planning undertaken to improve quality levels in waters
designated for a greater variety of future uses; and experimentation
conducted with unconventional methods for improving water quality.
As Secretary Udall reported to the Senate last August,
the end result of the standards provision is that for the first
time in water areas throughout the country, a specified set of
conditions to adhere to and look for in enhancing and pro-
tecting water quality is provided. . . . The major and most
meaningful activities of the water quality standards program
lie ahead."'
.5. Is Stricter Regulation Advisable?—To probe the question posed
by the heading, it is necessary to refine it somewhat. The degree of
191 Id. § 466g(g) (2). See 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 435.
192 Guidelines, supra note 101, at 7. Reliance on state enforcement has the added
advantage of avoiding the de novo court review required under federal enforcement
procedures and the specific invocation of an economic feasibility test. See Control Act,
supra note Si, § 466g (h) (Supp. 11 1965-66).
193 Guidelines, supra note 101, at 4.
194 Summary Status Report to the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Comm. on Public Works 3,5 (Aug. 1967) (as yet unpublished).
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strictness contemplated must be specified. Crucial to this process is the
consideration of what are the permissible bounds of regulation in the
water quality area. What do the relevant statutory provisions autho-
rize and how are they likely to be handled by the courts? Finally
whether enforcement is to be instituted by state or federal authorities
must also be considered.
Looking first at state regulation, the modern state acts confer on
the pollution control agencies a broad grant of regulatory powers to
protect the legitimate beneficial uses of water.' Under most state
acts the regulatory agency would seem to be granted the discretion to
regulate as strictly as it deemed appropriate.' Ordinarily, the orders
of the state regulatory agency are expressly subject to review by state
courts. In a few states this review is de novo,' but in most states the
review is on the record, which means the agency's findings of facts are
deemed final unless not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the
agency's orders are prima facie reasonable and valid."' It would appear,
then, that an industry appealing the abatement order of a typical state
pollution control agency could raise three issues: the regulation is
unconstitutional; the fact findings are not supported by the evidence;
or the agency's order is so unreasonable and arbitrary as to be invalid.
The constitutionality issue is most surely untenable" and it is usu-
ally difficult to quarrel with findings of fact. So the industry is left to
argue the reasonableness of the abatement order. Based on several
recent state court decisions, it would appear that the courts are not
unaware of the public ire concerning the degradation of local waters 2 00
199 See Suggested State Act, supra note 153, §§ 1, 4.
199 See Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality,
Part I: State Pollution Control Programs, 52 Iowa L. Rev. 186, 219 (1966).
107 See, e.g., Ala. Code tit. 22, § • 140(9) (n) (Supp. 1965) ; Iowa Code Ann.
§ 455B.18 (Supp. 1968). In some states an interdepartmental review is provided prior
to an appeal to the courts. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 23, § 710(1) (1953) ; La. Rev.
Stat. § 56:1442 (1966) ; W. Va. Code Aim. § 20-5A-15 (Supp. 1967).
me See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 149:14 (1964) ; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 82, § 913
(Supp. 1967) ; Suggested State Act, supra note 153, § 11(c).
199 Two possible constitutional law issues could be raised. First, it could be claimed
that the regulation constitutes a taking of property without due process. The notion here
is that the right to use a watercourse for waste disposal is a property right that cannot
be terminated without the payment of just compensation. The vested rights argument is
particularly appropriate to the creation and alteration of water quality standards. The
other constitutional issue that might be raised is that the regulatory activity conducted
by the pollution control agency represents an improper delegation of legislative power
to the agency. The modern tolerance for legislative delegation makes this argument of
little likely avail. These constitutional issues are fully discussed in Hines, supra note 196,
at 211-15.
299 See Town of Waterford v. Water Pollution Control Bd., 5 N.Y.2d 171, 182
N.Y.S.2d 785, 156 N.E.2d 427 (1959) (financial hardship not relevant to Water Pollution
Control Board's classification of a particular body of water) ; Commonwealth a rel.
Alessandroni v. Borough of Couldersport, 85 Dauph. 82 (Dauphin County Ct., Pa.
1966) (financial hardship will not excuse noncompliance with an abatement order) ;
Vermont Woolen Corp. v. Wackerman, 122 Vt. 219, 227-28, 167 A.2d 533, 538-39 (1961)
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It is not clear how substantial an economic burden may be placed on
an industry by a state pollution abatement order, but it seems obvious
that industry's historical position—that it should not be forced to
incur waste treatment costs that are not economically justified from
a production standpoint—will not prevail.
The regulatory powers of the federal pollution program appear
much more assailable than those of state agencies. The federal grant
of powers is drafted in terms of pollution "endangering the health or
welfare of persons,"" language which sounds suspiciously like a
public health oriented regulatory mission. The recent legislative history
would suggest a much broader sphere of interest, 202 but on its face the
federal power appears narrower than the equivalent state authority.'
The particular industry prosecuted under the federal act has a
much more favorable situation if the case reaches the courts because
a federal court has the power to hear the matter de novo if it chooses.'
In any event, in reviewing the order of the federal agency, the court
is expressly directed to give "due consideration to the practicability
and to the physical and economic feasibility of securing abatement of
any pollution proved . . . ."" Because no federal enforcement case in-
volving an industry has ever raised the issue it is uncertain what
interpretation would be given to the "economic feasibility" language,
but it would appear that economics arguments would have a greater
likelihood of success in a federal proceeding than in a state review.
Assuming that considerable latitude exists, at least at the state
level, for tightening pollution enforcement, the next question presented
(financial hardship imposed by antipollution order does not render such order unreason-
able or unconstitutional, in view of the strong public interest in pollution abatement).
201 Control Act, supra note 81, § 466g(d) (I) (Supp. II 1965-66). Economic in-
jury to the interstate commerce in shellfish products is also a ground for federal
action. Id.
202 The explanation for the health orientation lies in the fact that originally the
federal pollution control effort was administered by the Surgeon General of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare. Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155
(1948). When administrative responsibility was transferred to the Secretary of the In-
terior, the language of the Act was not rewritten. However, the interpretation to be
placed on the term welfare seems rather clear in view of the language of the water
quality standards provisions, Control Act, supra note 81, § 466g(c) (3) (Supp. II 1965-66),
and the legislative history behind the shift. H.R. Rep. No. 215, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965) (reprinted in 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3313 (1965)); S. Rep. No. 10, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965).
203 At least one commentator has suggested that a major reason that the federal
power is generally more vaguely defined than equivalent state powers relates to the
uncertainties surrounding the federal constitutional power to regulate in the water
pollution field. Wendell, Intergovernmental Relations in Water Quality Control, in
Symposium, supra note 83, at 14. Because no police power exists in the federal govern-
ment, Congress' power to regulate water quality must be derived from its power to
protect interstate commerce. See Corwin, The Constitution of the United States of
America 159 (1964 ed.).
204 Control Act, supra note 81, § 466g(h) (Supp. II 1965-66).
205 Id.
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is whether stringent regulation is a policy likely to be adopted by
pollution control agencies. If history is any guide, 2o° the answer is
probably no; however, in water quality matters, predictions based on
past performance have been notably unreliable in recent years. Un-
doubtedly, a substantial increase in the rigor of pollution regulation
is inevitable if any hope is held for achieving the national water quality
policy discussed earlier. In the final analysis; the degree of regulatory
pressure applied to pollution sources probably will turn on an assess-
ment of the relative effectiveness of regulation versus other means for
hastening the attainment of the nation's water quality goals. Without
doubt, rigid regulation is the most direct means for obtaining the
desired waste management. The problem, however, is achieving the
nation's water quality aspirations without unduly sacrificing other of
society's recognized values. For this reason, it is somewhat premature
to speculate on what the future holds for water quality regulation
before exploring the other alternatives for generating industrial in-
vestment in waste treatment facilities.
This much, however, should be noted: Strengthened regulation is
likely to have a considerable impact on the inclusion of adequate
waste treatment measures in the construction and operation of new
industrial plants. There is increasing evidence that industry is on the
threshold of accepting the notion that waste treatment is a production
cost to be considered in both the design and operation of new plants."'
On the new construction front, aggressive regulation based on water
quality standards may be the most successful technique for water
quality management. It should be borne in mind, however, that regu-
lation of this type only serves to prevent the addition of new pollution
sources.
The existing plants of established industries pose a much different
problem. These plants were designed and built under a different code
of waste management rules than now prevails. In many cases, the
modifications required in order to conform to present water quality
standards may be economically prohibitive.' Strict enforcement of
antipollution laws against this segment of industry may achieve the
objective of improved water quality at the expense of eliminating the
2°6 As noted earlier, the history of pollution control enforcement in this country
has not been one of vigorous action. See E. Murphy, Water Purity 95-130 (1961) ; Hines,
supra note 196, at 205-06, 277-30; Stein, Problems and Programs in Water Pollution, 2
Natural Resources J. 388, 407-08 (1962).
207 Interview with Secretary Udall, 2 Chemical 26, No. 12 (Dec. 1966) ; Industry
Joins Battle To Stem Pollution Tide, Business Week 76-77 (Dec. 31, 1966).
208 Hearing on S. 4, supra note 161, at 56; Hearings on H.R. 3988 and S. 4 Before
the House Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 110, 132-33 (1965) ; Car-
michael, Forty Years of Water Pollution Control in Wisconsin: A Case Study, 1967
Wis. L. Rev. 350, 402-03.
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polluter along with the pollution, unless the enforcement is accom-
panied by some type of economic aid.
B. Financial Assistance and Incentivesw°
One of the things that has always bothered me is that
when you talk tough, if that is the correct phrase, to a munici-
pality, you can at the same time that you are waving the
stick show the carrot. . . . There is not a comparable left
hand/right hand arrangement that I would like to have as
the administrator when dealing with industry. You can talk
tough, but at the same time you cannot show that you are
fully conscious and appreciative of their problem by saying
we can also be helpful.21°
Former FWPCA Commissioner Quigley's concern is undoubtedly
shared by many pollution control administrators. Enforcement is most
likely to be successful in a context where both the enforcement agency
and the polluter believe that compliance with the abatement order
does not place an unmanageable burden on the polluter. Increased
financial participation by the government in the costs of constructing
and operating facilities for treatment of industrial wastes would be
an obvious palliative to more enforcement. Different levels of gov-
ernment already absorb directly or indirectly a sizable share of the
costs of industrial waste treatment.
1. Existing Programs and the Delay Problem.—At the federal level
there are few direct financial assistance and incentive programs for
pollution control. Since 1966, the Water Pollution Control Act has
authorized the FWPCA to support industrial research and demonstra-
tion projects aimed at improving waste management.' Two current
federal programs can offer limited financial aid to industries with
serious fiscal problems in meeting pollution control requirements. The
Small Business Administration is authorized to give a priority in loans
to firms faced with financial difficulty in making heavy capital invest-
209 A provision of the Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, 33 U.S.C. § 466n
(Supp. II 1965-66), required the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a full and complete
study of methods for providing incentives to industry and report to Congress the
results of the study along with his recommendations by Jan. 30, 1968. Responsibility for
preparation of this report was contracted out to the ART Associates, Inc. of Cambridge,
Mass. The report was finally submitted to Congress in March 1968.
2" 1967 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 80 (remarks of Commissioner Quigley).
211 33 U.S.C. § 466c-1 (Supp. II 1965-66). See 1967 House Hearings, supra note
17, at 104, where 10 project grants to industries are reported totaling $2,619,704; 1
CCH Water Control News, No. 50, at 2 (May 1, 1967) (describing the 10 industries).
See also ABT Associates, Inc., Incentives to Industry for Water Pollution Control:
Policy Considerations 24 (Dec. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Incentives to Industry
Report]. As estimated, 5-10 million dollars has been expended to underwrite research
and demonstration projects concerned with industrial pollution. Id.
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ments for pollution control facilities.' The newly created Economic
Development Administration has limited authority, in assisting indus-
try, to make grants and loans" which could be used for investment in
pollution control measures.
The most significant direct assistance to industrial pollution abate-
ment is currently provided by the federal income tax structure. Pollu-
tion control facilities may be depreciated for federal tax purposes.
The depreciation writeoff means that 30 -45 percent of the cost of
pollution control facilities is borne by the Government in the form of
reduced tax revenues from business firms."' Costs of maintaining and
operating waste treatment facilities are also deductible as necessary
business expenses. In addition, industry may claim the seven percent
investment tax credit for construction of water pollution control facili-
ties. 215
 However, none of these tax breaks offers a meaningful incentive
for an industry to choose waste treatment investment over other ex-
penditures that offer a greater return.
The principal indirect federal assistance to industrial waste treat-
ment is provided through the municipal construction grant program.'
The federal program to support construction of municipal waste
treatment works was funded at $203 million for fiscal 1968' and is
currently authorized at $700 million for fiscal 1969, 218
 but the actual
appropriation will probably not approach that level.' Industries able
to discharge their wastes into municipal sewers for treatment in
municipal sewage plants can thereby avoid the expense of construct-
ing and operating separate treatment facilities. Over one-quarter of
the nation's industrial wastes are currently being treated in municipal
plants." The economies of scale that can be achieved through joint,
municipal-industrial waste treatment should recommend this approach
212 See 1 CCH Water Control News, No. 3, at 11 (June 6, 1966) ; id. No. 44, at
5 (March 20, 1967).
213 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3121-226 (Supp. 1967).
214 Of the 2.2 billion dollars invested by industry in pollution control facilities, it
is estimated that 660-990 million dollars has been indirectly financed by the Government
through tax reductions. Incentives to Industry Report, supra note 211, at 24.
215 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 38, 46. During the brief period between October 10,
1966, and March 9, 1967, when the investment credit was suspended, water pollution
control facilities were specifically exempted from the suspension if they met certain
requirements. 26 U.S.C. § 48(h) (12) (3) (Supp. II 1965-66). One of the requirements
was certification by the Secretary of the Interior.
215 Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, 33 U.S.C. .§ 466e (Supp. II 1965-66),
amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 466e(b)-(d), (f), (g) (Supp. I 1965).
217 Spending on construction grants was cut back 23.4 million dollars for fiscal
1968.2 CCH Water Control News, No. 37, at 8 (Jan. 29, 1968).
218 33 U.S.C. § 466e(d) (Supp. II 1965-66).
219 The Administration's budget asking for the construction grant program for
fiscal 1969 was 225 million dollars. 2 CCH Water Control News, No. 38, at 6 (Feb. 5,
1968).
220 Incentives to Industry Report, supra note 211, at 24-25.
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to many more industries whose wastes are acceptable by municipal
plants."' Municipal-industrial cooperation in waste treatment is spe-
cifically encouraged under both the federal construction grant and the
demonstration grant programs, 222 and the suggestion has been advanced
that municipalities could directly assist industry within the framework
of the existing federal program by building municipal works for the
express purpose of treating industrial wastes.'"
It should be noted that by indirectly benefiting industries able
to obtain waste treatment services from a municipality, the federal
construction grants covertly discriminate against industries which do
not have that option available to them. In his Incentives to Industry Re-
port recently submitted to Congress, Secretary Udall agrued forcefully
that the municipal grant program should not be utilized to provide in-
direct assistance to industries.'" The principal reasons advanced for
this position are based on the premise that a municipality ordinarily will
not charge an industry the full costs of treating its wastes because
the contributions of state and federal construction funds will be dis-
regarded. Therefore, because industry will not bear the true cost
of purifying its wastes, it is contended that use of municipal facilities
partially supported by federal grants operates as a disincentive to
industries to manage their wastes effectively.
At the state level, a number of tax measures designed to encourage
industrial waste treatment have recently been enacted. Many states
exempt water pollution control facilities from state property taxes,'"
while others grant special exemptions from or credits against cor-
porate,R 26 income,'" and sales tax levies.'" Also, accelerated deprecia-
221 This approach is not a solution for the many industries whose waters cannot be
handled by conventional sewage treatment methods. For a discussion of the various
problems in mixing industrial discharges with sanitary sewage, see N. Nemerow,
Theories and Practices of Industrial Waste Treatment 13-14, 143-83 (1963).
222 Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, 33 U.S.C. § 446e-1 (Supp. II 1965-66).
221 See 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 513.
224 "The current municipal grant program should be restricted to facilities for
treating domestic wastes, and made conditional on demonstration that industrial wastes
are treated for a service charge based on the full costs of such treatment." Incentives to
Industry Report, supra note 211, at 55.
225 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 12-81(51) (Supp. 1966); Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 59, § 5 (Supp. 1968). See 2 CCH Water Control News, No. 24, at 41-44 (Oct.
30, 1967).
220 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 59, § 5 (Supp. 1968) ; N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 105-296 (Supp. 1967). See 2 CCH Water Control News, No. 24, at 41-44 (Oct. 30,
1967).
227 See, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 82, § 923 (Supp. 1967) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 314.250
(1967). See 2 CCH Water Control News, No. 24, at 41-44 (Oct. 30, 1967).
225 See, e.g., P.A. 57, § 28, 1967 Conn. Laws (Conn. Leg. Serv. No. 1, at 63 (1967)) ;
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 120, § 439.102a (Smith-Hurd 1968). See 2 CCH Water Control News,
No. 24, at 41-44 (Oct. 30, 1967).
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tion of pollution control works is authorized in a few states. 229 How-
ever, state tax incentives are generally conceded to have been a minor
factor in encouraging industry to adopt water pollution control mea-
sures. 230 No state has yet authorized direct construction grants to
industry but at least one state has created a board to administer
financial and technical assistance for water resources planning and
development.231
One reason for seriously considering direct financial assistance and
incentive programs is that, without such aid, industry may effectively
thwart the nation's water quality improvement timetable through de-
laying tactics. The tangible advantages derived from such tactics are
manifold. Waste treatment maintenance and operating costs are saved
and capital may be employed for more profitable purposes. By stalling
its investment in waste treatment, the industry may be able to benefit
from cost saving new technology or may be the recipient of benefits
under some future government aid program. As was noted in the
earlier enforcement discussion, neither the threat nor the commence-
ment of enforcement proceedings is a compelling reason for a firm
to alter its waste disposal practices immediately. A company wishing
to postpone investment in waste treatment may not only gamble that
the enforcement pressure will be minimal, but it may also capitalize on
the time lags built into most enforcement procedures, and further defer
the effect of an adverse determination by challenging the abatement
order in court. In summary, an industry that elects a deliberate
strategy of delay may be able to postpone for years the day when it
must finally commit firm resources to pollution abatement. Therefore,
any proposal designed to stimulate industry to attach a high priority
to waste treatment investment must be evaluated against this back-
ground of potential delay. 232
2. Proposed Programs Reviewed.—In appraising the various avenues
for stimulating industrial investment in water pollution control, a cer-
tain tension must be recognized between the need to motivate construc-
tion of facilities, the objective of promoting economic efficiency in
waste management and the desire to treat the various industries
equitably. The Incentives to Industry Report suggests that it is useful
to distinguish between programs for increased government assistance
to industry in meeting pollution control costs and proposals designed
to provide incentives to industry to improve their own pollution con-
229 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.04(26) (Supp. 1967). See 2 CCH Water Control
News, No. 24, at 41-44 (Oct. 30, 1967).
239 See Views of the Governors on Tax Incentives and Effluent Charges, Report of
the House Comm. on Gov't Operations 11, H.R. 1330, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
231 III. Ann. Stat. ch. 19, § 1008.09 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
232 For a more definitive discussion of the delay problem, see Incentives to Industry
Report, supra note 211, at 9, 26.
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trol performance.' Both types of proposals must be evaluated on
the basis of whether they promote' efficient waste management; whether
they are equitable; and whether they are politically and administratively
feasible. Incentives proposals are subject to further scrutiny as to
whether they are reasonably calculated to accomplish the desired change
in waste management behavior. Three types of special programs are
considered below: direct payments and grants, special tax treatment,
and loans.
a. Direct Payments and Grants.—Strategically applied payments
to industry for eliminating waste discharges could provide an incentive
effect similar to the effluent charge detailed below." In theory, payment
based on the extent to which the industry's waste load is reduced could
supply the motivation to improve waste management now so clearly
lacking. In practice, however, such a program contains so great a
potential for inequities and waste of scarce public funds, that it seems
beyond the pale of political feasibility.
Although no one has yet seriously advocated an industrial water
quality program based on direct payments for pollution reduction, the
industrial sector has long advocated a system of direct federal
matching grants to industry for construction of waste treatment in-
stallations.235 Such a government program would clearly offer the
maximum assistance to industry among the proposals currently being
pressed A sizable federal grant program also would have an incentive
impact; however, it seems questionable whether even as vigorous a
federal grant program as one patterned on the present municipal con-
struction grants would provide the incentive for significantly hastening
improvements in industrial waste management comparable to the recent
gains in municipal construction. Unless the Government is willing to
share a higher proportion of the cost of treatment plant construction
than is offered in the municipal grant program, it is difficult to believe
that industry would view the availability of a federal grant as sufficient
inducement to commit a large part of its investment funds to facilities
that return no income. Other difficulties lurking in the grant proposals
are: that grants may bias industry to choose less efficient methods of
waste disposal because the Government's sharing in the construction
cost makes grant supported methods cost less to the firm; that they
discriminate in favor of firms who have been dilatory in attacking their
waste management problems; and that they are likely to involve
rather high administrative costs."
233 Id. at 3-4.
234 A. Kneese, The Economics of Regional Water Quality Management 57-58,
195-96, 203-06 (1964).
235 Such a proposal was deleted from the original 1948 Act before it was passed.
S. 418, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1947).
236 Incentives to Industry Report, supra note 211, at 46-47
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To provide grants of sufficient size to attract industry to waste
treatment investment would place substantial demands on the already
limited governmental resources being applied to environmental quality
problems. The fundamental question with the grant approach is
whether a high assistance, low incentive program of this cost magnitude
is justified in light of the other alternatives for dealing with industrial
water pollution that place much less demand on the public weal and
have a greater likelihood of inducing efficient waste management.
The Incentives to Industry Report rejects the idea of a direct
grant program," but admits that it has certain advantages over other
approaches. The Report suggests that if grants are used to assist in-
dustry, they be limited to existing firms, restricted in time, and be
broad enough in scope to encourage employment of central treatment
systems and land intensive treatment methods where appropriate.
b. Special Tax Treatment. —Two incentive proposals that enjoy
considerable support both in industry and in Congress involve the crea-
tion of special tax incentives. One plan proposed in the 89th Congress
called for authorization of accelerated amortization of the cost of
pollution control facilities.. " 8 The other proposal regularly introduced
in Congress would create a bonus investment credit for pollution
control measures.'" If, under the first plan, the write-off period was as
short as a year or two, industry would gain a greater economic benefit
through accelerated amortization than doubling or even tripling the
investment credit."° However, neither of these tax incentive proposals
has been well received by the Internal Revenue.' The recent Incen-
tives to Industry Report strongly rejects the special tax incentives
approach, but suggests that if such a method is adopted, a large (30%)
special investment credit would be the most likely to produce the
desired water quality results."'
237 tilt does not seem that direct cost sharing for the bulk of industrial firms
is justified. Such a program would have the following disadvantageous effects
on efficiency: high administrative costs, low probability of offering positive
incentive, and the possibility of increasing a firm's incentive to delay while
lowering its incentive either to engage in efficient process changes to abate
pollution or to join in a government treatment system.
Id. at 47.
238 See S. Rep. No. 1367, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1966).
See 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 309, 532. FWPCA Commissioner
Quigley announced his support for some type of tax incentive to industry in 1967. See
1967 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 80.
240 See 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 517 Table A.
247 Secretary Udall, in discussing tax incentives, has indicated his general ap-
proval of the idea but cautioned: "This is going to be, obviously, a considerable battle,
because I am not so sure the Treasury Department will favor any tax incentives."
Hearings on H.R. 13104 and H.R. 16076 Before the House Comm. on Public Works,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1966) ; see also 1 CCH Water Control News, No. 42, at 1 (March
6, 1967).
242 Incentives to Industry Report, supra note 211, at 42, 46.
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Of the three types of programs examined herein, granting special
tax benefits to industry for pollution control investment is at the same
time the most feasible politically and the least defensible on the merits.
Tax adjustments are unlikely to have significant incentive effect; they
are likely to bias firms in favor of inefficient waste management
methods; and they contain the potential for substantial inequities.
The incentive effect of special tax relief for investment in waste
management is highly questionable. A special investment credit of
seven percent amounts to a net benefit to the firm of three and one-half
percent of the facility's costs. Thus, while the tax credit makes an
unprofitable investment somewhat less unprofitable, the investment
still represents a net loss. For industries about to be or already subject
to enforcement orders to build new facilities, a tax relief of this type
would no doubt be welcome; however, it is unlikely that industrial de-
cision makers would undertake expensive pollution control projects to
obtain the proposed level of tax relief.
The Incentives to Industry Report argued against using tax relief
to increase pollution control investment.' The report suggests that
special tax relief will cause an industry to look for the type of acceptable
treatment method whereby it can obtain the maximum tax advantage.
No assurance exists that the treatment alternatively chosen will be
the least cost pollution prevention option to the firm as well as the lowest
total cost method from the governmental viewpoint. For example,
under present tax proposals, acquisition of mechanical devices for
waste treatment would result in a tax credit, but the acquisition of land
or investment in new production methods would not Land intensive
methods of waste disposal or production method modification may be
the most efficient means for handling the firm's waste problems, but they
may be neglected in favor of mechanical treatment because the govern-
ment's participation in the latter method makes it the least cost alterna-
tive to the firm.
The report also presents a more fundamental economic argument.
Additional government aid undermines the operation of the free com-
petitive market because it permits an industrial firm to shift a part of
the pollution costs generated by its production to the community at
large, and, therefore, to sell its products at a price lower than if the full
cost of production had to be recovered from the consumer.
Superficially, it would appear that the way to assure equitable
treatment under the tax relief approach would be to make the benefits
available on an across-the-board basis. However, this "shotgun" ap-
proach will invariably create substantial inequities in that many re-
cipients of the program's benefits do not merit the assistance offered,
while others are not in a position to take full advantage of the incen-
243 Id. at 42-44.
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tives. The granting of special economic concessions to those industries
which have been dilatory in cleaning up their wastes actually works an
inequity against industries which have already assumed their proper
responsibility for waste management.' 4 Furthermore, the tax incen-
tive proposals are of substantially greater value to efficient and•pros-
perous businesses than they are to industries with low economic effi-
ciency and large pollution problems,245 the group most needing govern-
ment aid.
Another issue consistently raised regarding the use of tax laws to
stimulate pollution control concerns the soundness of creating a further
complication in the federal tax structure. A new special tax benefit would
also create considerable budgetary uncertainty in respect to the amount
of the tax revenues that would be lost. Because the effects of the tax
relief program cannot be known in advance, the nation is committed to
an uncertain amount of assistance in an area where it is difficult to
measure at any point the full impact of the program on the public
treasury 2 46
C. Loans.—Industry has advocated government loans for con-
struction of pollution control facilities much less strenuously than
it has urged either direct grants or tax relief. The obvious explanation
for this cool attitude is that loans furnish significantly less benefit to in-
dustry than either of the other two proposals.' To a large company
with adequate access to the capital market, the only benefit that would
flow from government loans for pollution control would be in the form of
lower interest and more favorable loan terms. To hardship industries
not able to obtain money in the capital market, however, government
loans could spell the difference between continued operation and cessa-
tion of business.
Because loans ordinarily involve less distortion of the competitive
market, they are the aid least subject to criticism on grounds of
economic efficiency. Furthermore, since the use of the loan money
involves a cost and loans must ultimately be repaid, loan programs
offer the least opportunity for industry to shift pollution costs away
from its consumers. To the extent that loans were made available to
firms which could not otherwise raise money for pollution control in-
vestment, they would have the highest incentive potential of any of the
244 J. Merrel, Federal Incentives for the Construction of Industrial Waste Water
Treatment Facilities and Programs for Industrial Waste Water Treatment Research and
Demonstration Grants, Utah State Univ., Conference on Industrial Waste Water 5 (Aug.
10, 1967).
245 S. Rep. No. 1367, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1966).
246 See Incentives to Industry Report, supra note 211, at 44-45.
244 Nevertheless, it is estimated that the value of a loan to a firm may run as high
as 20% to 50% of the value of the loan, depending on the terms of the loan and the
firm's discount rate. Id. at 48.
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government aid proposals because a firm without any alternatives is
most susceptible to the incentive features of the program.
On the other hand, loans would involve the highest administrative
cost of any of the proposals and, unless the program was restricted to
industries that could not otherwise raise capital, the incentive effect
would be uncertain. In addition, a loan program is subject to the same
general objection as other financial aid programs: it may induce in-
dustry to adopt a less efficient approach to waste management because
financial aid is available to support that approach.
The Incentives to Industry Report recommends consideration of a
federal loan program, the funds to be made available at or near the
market interest rate.218 The theory behind the suggestion is that by
pegging the cost of the loan funds at market, only firms who cannot
obtain money in the regular capital market would apply for government
aid. Thus, the loan program would operate principally for the benefit
of industries facing hardship in securing the financing for pollution
abatement facilities. The report suggests that the loan program be
limited in duration and be restricted to existing firms for improvements
that will bring their waste disposal practices within the water quality
standards.'"
d. Conclusions.—The difficulty in achieving fairness and effi-
ciency in the operation of a broad gauge program of government assis-
tance or incentives to industry, coupled with serious reservations in just-
ifying the cost of such measures, explain the demonstrated reluctance to
pursue this course of action in attacking the industrial pollution prob-
lem. Two basic ideas run through the proposals for government aid.
(1) Some of the proposals are advanced on incentive grounds.
The theory that underlies these proposed programs apparently holds
that many industry decision makers are in a state of equilibrium on the
question of pollution control investment and that a small nudge in the
form of government aid will move them to commit their firm to a
pollution abatement program. This view of the business world does not
seem to be supported by the hard economic facts of industrial pollution
control.
(2) Most proposals can be justified only as a palliative to en-
forcement designed to hasten compliance in the construction of facilities
already required. In the final analysis, evaluation of these proposals
turn on resolution of an essential policy question: Whether, recognizing
that the costs are high and the efficiency factors low, it is nevertheless
in the public interest for government to participate substantially in
industry's pollution abatement costs.
248 Id. at 49.
242 Id. at 50.
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In the long run, considerations of fairness and efficiency would
seem to require each industry to absorb its own costs of installing and
maintaining water pollution control facilities. If public enforcement
measures can be relied upon to force the necessary expenditures, then
private incentives, perhaps coupled with an efficient regional waste
management system, will assure that each plant's waste problem is
solved on a least cost basis.
It has been clear from the outset that if the nation's citizens
seriously want clean water, inevitably the cost of gratifying that desire
would be visited on the public in one form or another. In respect to
the cost of abating industrial pollution, private industry undoubtedly
has a greater ability than government efficiently to pass that cost along
to the public through an increased price for goods and services. If
the manufacturing of a good or the rendering of a service produces a
polluting waste, the cost of managing that waste should be borne
directly by the consumers in the price paid for the good or service.
When pollution control is correctly viewed as an ordinary cost of
production, this solution seems both reasonable and just. A growing
segment of the business community is coming to endorse this "do it
ourselves" approach.'
As a practical matter; not every industry will be in a position to
finance needed pollution control improvements independently or have
available a municipal system that can handle its wastes. For these
industries some form of government assistance is essential if the
nation's water quality objectives are to be achieved and the marginal
industry is to remain viable. If local programs cannot or will not fill
this breach, federal assistance through some form of loan program,
perhaps similar to that administered by the Small Business Administra-
tion, would seem necessary. A selective loan program to deal with cases
of economic hardship would not seem inconsistent with a policy of
250 See Fortune, March 1967, at 101; 1967 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 29;
Moore, The National Focus on Water Quality, U.S. Dept. of the Interior News Release,
May 27, 1968, at 5.
The extent to which industry can mobilize itself to deal with water quality problems,
if adequate motivation exists, is illustrated by a recent development in "soft" detergents.
In the early part of this decade the detergent industry was under attack on all fronts by
pollution control forces because the foaming agents in its products continued to operate
long after passing through normal sewage treatment processes, to the manifest con-
sternation of downstream users of the frothy water. Extensive hearings were held on the
detergent problem and at least one state threatened to ban the sale of the products. The
detergent industry reported encouraging progress in research to create biodegradable
detergents and so government action was delayed to an agreed deadline for producing an
acceptable product substitute. By marshalling its research forces, the industry developed
and introduced the "soft" detergent within the deadline and the case was effectively
closed. 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 1, at 158-210. However, detergents con-
tinue to present a few water quality problems. See 2 CCH Water Control News, No. 30,
at 6 (Dec. 11, 1967). The most serious is probably that the phosphates they contain act
as nutrients upon aquatic vegetation. See id: No. 36, at 2 (Jan. 22, 1968).
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assigning to industry the primary responsibility for providing the needed
investment in pollution control facilities—loans result in only a
temporary deflection of the investment burden. Strategic responses
to clearly identified problem situations seems to be the role for which
the federal government is best suited in water quality management."
C. Effluent Charges
Probably no other suggested approach to water quality improve-
ment has attracted more heated discussion in the past several years
than the idea of imposing effluent charges on polluters.' This uncon-
ventional proposal, a German import,'" is founded on a fairly con-
ventional economic theory: If market forces do not allocate resources
efficiently, an optimizing system should be created to simulate the
allocative processes of a viable market. As stated earlier, the economic
core of the pollution problem is that waste dischargers were tradition-
ally allowed cost-free use of the nation's watds at the expense of
downstream uses. Therefore, the most direct means to redress the
present imbalance in waste management costs is to impose a charge on
the disposal of wastes into water. As a matter of economic theory, if
the charge were equivalent to the total of all downstream damages
resulting from the wastes discharged by the firm against whom the
charge is assessed, the external diseconomies would be eliminated and
251 The Incentives to Industry Report recommends the use of a low interest loan
program for what it refers to as "hardship" cases. Also suggested is a short period of
grace exempting such plants from the standards requirements. Incentives to Industry
Report, supra note 211, at 119.
252 See generally 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 3, at 912-61; 1966
Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 308, 321; Carmichael, Forty Years of Water Pollution
Control in Wisconsin: A Case Study, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 350, 415; Delogu, Effluent
Charges: A Method of Enforcing Stream Standards, 19 Maine L. Rev. 29 ( 1967) ;
Industrial Water Pollution Control, in Mill and Factory (Nov. 1966).
253 The concept of effluent charges is derived from the practices of the Genossen-
shaf ten (Cooperative Water Associations) that have experienced substantial success in
managing the quality of water in heavily industrialized river basins in Germany. The
German associations operate much like an American drainage district or irrigation dis-
tricts except that their purpose is to plan and operate a comprehensive program for
managing the quality of waters in the basin.
The waste treatment and disposal systems of the entire river basin are integrated
under one master plan to assure maintenance of an agreed level of quality in the basin's
waters. The Association builds necessary waste treatment facilities, reservoirs, and dams
and locates them strategically in the basin to achieve the maximum quality control
efficiency from the installations. These pollution control works are financed by a charge
assessed against every city and industry discharging wastes into the river system. The fee
is based on the strength and volume of the effluent discharged. Through the Association,
the costs of pollution are assigned directly to the polluter, rather than borne by
downstream water users, as is too often the case in this country. Waste treatment by the
Association offers substantial advantages to industries in that the charges are fully tax
deductible and the Association's treatment works qualify for governthental assistance
that private industry cannot obtain. See generally A. Kneese, supra note 234, at 121-87;
Industrial Water Pollution Control, in Mill and Factory 54-57. (Nov. 1966) ; 1965
Senate Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 3, at 927-50.
604
INDUSTRIAL WATER POLLUTION
approximated market forces would begin to function. In other words,
if disposal into water was not the least cost method of handling its
wastes, industry would develop other methods. In such a situation,
private incentives would encourage the polluter to reduce waste loads
by all relevant means—treatment, process adjustments, waste recovery
and plant location—to the extent that the costs of these measures
could be profitably traded off against reduced effluent charges. Thus, by
providing a proper level of incentive for reducing waste discharge,
the effluent charge promotes an optimal level of waste management
that should minimize the social cost of pollution.' Furthermore, be-
cause the charge is directly related to the costs occasioned by each
individual polluter, it effects an equitable accommodation among pol-
luters and between each polluter and the community.
A substantial portion of the disagreement concerning the merits
of the effluent charge can be traced to lack of precision in articulating
how the concept would be implemented to achieve specific water
quality objectives. 2 ' Of particular uncertainty are the bases on which
the charges are to be assessed and the use to be made of the proceeds
collected. Several water quality management systems based on effluent
charges have been suggested.2"
The boldest step proposed is the adoption of the effluent charge
as a major tool in the national water quality improvement program."
Under this proposal effluent charges would be directly related to water
quality standards in a pollution control program administered by some
form of regional agency. The notion is that quality standards would
provide the regional resource management objectives and effluent
charges would provide the funds with which the objectives would be
pursued through a rationally organized management system. 25s In
the Administration's Clean River Restoration program submitted to
254 This economic theory is fully and articulately developed in A. Kneese, supra
note 234.
255 The Incentives to Industry Report found the effluent charge concept to be
worthy of "very serious consideration," but then more or less dismissed it as administra-
tively and politically impractical. It is submitted that the report may have viewed the
effluent charge concept too narrowly, as is demonstrated by the fact that the regional
basin authority proposed by the report is based in great measure on the charge idea.
Incentives to Industry Report, supra note 211, at 78-79.
256 The most elementary proposal is an enactment of a modest federal effluent tax,
the proceeds of which would be applied to supporting existing federal and state pollution
control programs. The tax would be based on some crude scale for measuring the
quantity of an industry's wastes. This arrangement would rely on private incentive
factors, heavily supplemented by ordinary control and enforcement techniques, to accom-
plish water quality goals, but it would also have the beneficial effect of shifting the cost
of pollution control to the parties occasioning the cost.
254 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 3, at 912-26 (statement of Allen
Kneese, Director, Water Resources Program, Resources for the Future, Inc.) ; Kneese,
Scope and Challenge of the Water Pollution Situation, in Water Pollution Control and
Abatement 8-12 (Willrich & Hines ed.:1967).
258 Delogu, supra note 252, at 29; A: Kneese, supra note 234.
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Congress in 1966, effluent charges were expressly to be considered by
the river basin planning agencies which the program would encour-
age.' This provision drew substantial criticism from industry" and
was deleted along with most of the river basin planning machinery in
final passage of the 1966 Act."
Nevertheless, using effluent charges to fund the development and
operation of a water quality management system organized on a basin
basis is promoted as the optimizing technique through which regional
water quality objectives can be achieved at the lowest overall cost."
The charge supplies incentive to improve in-plant waste management
procedures while simultaneously providing the necessary funds for
the regional control agency to build and operate the off-site control
facilities. The charge would relate directly to the costs each individual
discharger creates and would be calculated either on the basis of the
opportunity loss incurred downstream if the standards are not met or
the actual cost to the regional agency in providing the waste manage-
ment procedures necessary to comply with the standards."
The relation of the effluent charge to off-site costs of waste man-
agement appears to represent both the most workable method of
260 5.2987 § 104(b), 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
260 See, e.g., 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 302, 321, 532.
201 It appeared for a brief period that the federal government was flirting seriously
with the idea of promoting the effluent charge system in the same way it had pushed the
water quality standards program. In 1965 a Presidential advisory committee recom-
mended that "careful study be given to tax-like systems in which all polluters would be
subject to 'effluent charges' in proportion to their contribution to pollution." Report of
the Environmental Pollution Panel, President's Science Advisory Comm., Restoring the
Quality of Our Environment 17-18 (1965). In an unpublished paper prepared in April
of 1966, sponsored by the President's Council of Economic Advisors, the proposition was
advanced that "effluent charges should be seriously considered as a method of attaining
water quality improvement." Quoted in Thursby, Some Economic Implications of Water
Quality Management, in Symposium, supra note 83, at 60. The federal pressure for
comprehensive information regarding industrial waste management practices was seen by
some in industry as a harbinger of an effluent charge proposal. As already noted, § 104(b)
of the original Clean Rivers Restoration proposal included a direction to consider
effluent charges. After this legislation was drafted, Secretary Udall took a blue-ribbon
team to Germany to view first hand the operation of the effluent charge system.
Neither Secretary Udall nor Commissioner Quigley returned home very enthusiastic about
the applicability of the German experience to American pollution problems. In a con-
gressional hearing, Commissioner Quigley expressed doubts whether what he had seen in
Germany was adaptable within the framework of our social and political institutions and
Secretary Udall confessed his willingness to have the effluent charge language stricken
from the administrative proposal. 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 123, 138a; In-
dustrial Water Pollution Control, in Mill and Factory (Nov. 1966). The effluent charge
idea currently seems in limbo at the federal level, 'although apparently it is still being
tossed around within the FWPCA. See E. Johnson, A Study in the Economics of Water
Quality Management, 3 Water Resources Research No. 2 (2d Quarter 1967) (Johnson is
an FWPCA economist).
262 A. Kneese, supra note 234, at 54 -85; E. Johnson, supra note 261; Kern, A Dy-
namic Model for Water Quality Control, 39 Water Pollution Control Fed'n J. 772 (1967).
283 See 1965 Senate Hearings; supra note 34, pi. 5, at 921-22.
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assessing the charges and the most reasonable application of the pro-
ceeds from the charges. The range of water quality management
alternatives open to an agency which has planning, implementation and
enforcement jurisdiction coextensive with the regional basin includes
the realization of economies of scale in constructing and operating
collective waste treatment facilities, the management of stream flow
through storage reservoirs, direct improvement of the watercourse
itself at intervals, waste diversion channels, specialization of streams,
as well as regulation of on-site treatment procedures. Operating a
basin-wide system, the regional agency could strategically plan and
combine these measures to achieve the area's water quality standards
at the lowest cost, while financing its waste management activity
through assessment of a charge against polluters.' Described in this
fashion, the effluent charge appears less an alien incursion on American
resource management and more a sensible extension of the ordinary
sewage charge system long used by municipalities."'
The theoretical justification for the regional effluent charge sys-
tem is difficult to fault; however, the theory is not self-executing and
the practical obstacles to putting such a system into effect are substan-
tial.'" In the first place, the current lack of reliable information about
the quality and the use of the nation's waters at many locations as
well as the identity and contribution of waste dischargers would pose
a severe handicap to assessment of effluent charges based on any
precise calculation relating to downstream damages.' Steps are
267 The system described is approximately that recommended by the Incentives to
Industry Report as providing the most efficient and workable solution to the problems
of assisting industry to meet its water quality responsibilities. The principal difference is
that the authority suggested in the report would have neither policy formulation nor en-
forcement powers. Incentives to Industry Report, supra note 211, at 78-91.
265 It would indeed be unfortunate if the deletion of the effluent charge provision
from the 1966 federal act dissuades regional pollution control agencies from giving the
effluent charge the consideration it deserves. Clearly, not all river basins are either geo-
graphically suited or highly enough industrialized to warrant experimentation with de-
veloping a closely integrated regional water quality control organization based on the
levying of effluent charges, but enough American rivers would seem to be susceptible of
this type of intensive water management to make relevant the Genossenshaften experience.
Already 40% of America's urban population and a higher portion of our industries are
located in only 4 of our 22 river basins. These basins contain huge megalopolitan com-
plexes where the gains from intensive, systematic waste management would be high. For
a discussion of the practicality of attempting to apply the Genossenshaften concept to
various American river valleys, see 1965 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, pt. 3, at 919,
923-24.
260 Currently no state uses an effluent charge in its pollution control program, and
the prospects for adoption of such a system do not appear bright. See Views of the
Governors on Tax Incentives and Effluent Charges, Report by the House Comm. on
Gov't Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., H.R. No. 1330 (1966). Effluent charge systems
have been proposed for at least two states. See Carmichael, supra note 252, at 415;
Delogu, supra note 252, at 46.
207 A. Kneese, Water Pollution, Economic Aspects and Research Needs 57-85 (1962).
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presently underway to narrow this information gap."' Second, even
if enough facts were known about water quality and waste discharge
practices, the calculation of downstream damages based on all possible
factors raises extremely difficult problems of measuring and quantify-
ing such intangible social costs as injury to aesthetics and recreation?'"
These problems are as yet unsolved in relation to water resource
projects far less complicated than quantifying the social cost of
pollution." The point should be made, however, that the effluent
charge does not require exactness in calculation of damages to achieve
its desired incentive effects at a relatively high level.'
The alternative of basing the charge on the cost to the regional
water control organization of managing the discharger's waste avoids
these uncertainties, but it creates new problems. For example, if the
incentive theory is sound, the region will require more waste manage-
ment facilities at the commencement of the waste control program
than it may subsequently need as individual production units improve
their internal waste management procedures to cut costs. Careful
planning will be required to avoid waste resulting from early obso-
lescence of waste management works. On the other hand, if a regional
waste management program, such as collective treatment, provides
relatively low cost waste disposal, some of the incentive for experi-
menting with in-plant improvement may be removed. Of course, both
these situations only affect the realization of the economic goal of
maximum efficiency; the water quality objectives will nevertheless be
accomplished, although perhaps at a higher cost.
The most serious impediments to regional water quality manage-
ment financed by effluent charges may be the political difficulties in
creating an effective management agency. The theoretical soundness
of employing regional organizations to handle problems that assume
a regional configuration has long been recognized," but suc-
cesses have been rare in effecting the political adjustments necessary
to make the regional arrangements work. 223 Despite strong federal sup-
268 The FWPCA is currently conducting basin-wide water quality projects in relation
to its responsibility to develop comprehensive pollution control plans and programs. Water
Pollution Control Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 466a(a) (Supp. II 1965-66). Projects
covering 13 of the nation's 20 major basins are completed or underway. See Programs,
supra note 5, at 17.
269 See A. Kneese, supra note 234, at 71-73.
270 See A. Kneese, supra note 267, at 57-85; M. Clawson & J. Knetsch, Economics
of Outdoor Recreation 211-29 (1966).
271 A. Knees6, supra note 234, at 82-83.
272 "Our regions are realities. Political thinking must respond to these realities. In-
stead of leading to parochialism, it will bring a fresh ferment of political thought whereby
national aims may be achieved through various forms of political adjustments." Frank-
furter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution—A Study In Interstate Ad-
justments, 34 Yale L.J. 685, 729 (1925).
273 One cynic has put it thus: "The river basin plan is good river management but
it is not logical politically." F. Graham, Disaster by Default 217 (1966).
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port for the concept of regional water resource planning and manage-
ment,274 no organizational vehicle has yet enjoyed sufficient success
in carrying out regional programs so as to inspire emulation?" The
organization of the Delaware River Basin Commission is perhaps most
worthy of serving as a blueprint for highly developed industrial
areas. 27°
Considering the great diversity that exists among the nation's
river basins, it is probably unreasonable to make uniformity an
objective in river basin organization. A highly organized regional waste
management program appropriate to the Delaware River Basin is
probably not well suited to the upper Missouri River Valley. Ideally,
each river basin should be organized in the manner most conducive to
managing the water resource problems peculiar to that basin. For
example, many institutional arrangements presently exist for organiz-
ing water quality management on a problemshed basis. These range
from small intrastate watershed basin agencies, through interstate
compacts and regional federal-state commissions, to federal regional
subagencies. Imaginative new uses of existing institutions will be re-
quired and creation and experimentation with new institutional ar-
rangements should be encouraged. This needed flexibility complicates
the implementation of a national policy, but it seems essential if the
program is to be successful in the long run.
If the national policy to enhance water quality is to be imple-
mented through a regional approach to waste management, at the
moment it appears politically impractical to rely on state and local
initiative to create the necessary regional institutions. If local interests
fail to act, the impetus for regional management will very likely come
from above through a more deliberate federal program to force ac-
ceptance of the problemshed concept of organization. This step seems
just around the corner.'"
274 See 33 U.S.C. 	 466b (1964); id. II 466a(c), 466e(f) (Supp. II 1965-66); 42
U.S.C. § 1962c (Supp. I 1965).
275 The Incentives to Industry Report, supra note 211, at 80-90, devotes substantial
attention to the problems of organizing and operating a basin water quality management
authority.
276 See Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experiment in Co-operative Federal-
ism, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 825 (1963) ; see also Zimmerman & Wendell, New Horizons on
the Delaware, 36 State Gov't 157 (1963).
277 Adoption of the river basin provisions of the Administration's Clean Rivers
Restoration proposals in 1966 would have represented a major stride in the direction of
the regional approach. Unless the states take more initiative in this area, it is unlikely the
federal patience with uncoordinated local programs will long continue. See 1966 Senate
Hearings, supra note 4, at 123: "We must devise our own [basin-wide] systems to meet
our own needs." The basin authority recommendations of the recent Incentives to In-
dustry Report is another manifestation of the federal interest in the problemshed
approach to water quality.
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VI. CONCLUSION
As America's population and industrial prowess continue to mul-
tiply, one issue emerges with increasing clarity: "What quality of life
is to be afforded our citizens?" Wastes created by the good life,
American style, are accumulating at so rapid a pace that ours has
been dubbed the "effluent society." Pollution of the nation's lakes
and streams is probably the most serious of the problems currently
imperiling the quality of our physical environment.
Wastes discharged by industry constitute over one half of the
pollution load carried by our waters. To control and eventually to
eliminate the degradation of waterways by industrial wastes will re-
quire a massive investment in industrial waste management measures.
Traditionally, industry has not been motivated to invest substantial
sums in relatively unproductive processes like pollution control.
Strict enforcement of high water quality standards is one method
of inducing industry to invest in pollution control. A significant quick-
ening of enforcement activity is bound to occur under the new quality
standards approach to water pollution control. Good reason seems to
exist, however, for questioning whether total reliance on enforcement
is the most effective means for attaining the nation's water quality
objectives. Enforcement measures are no stronger than the resolve of
the public officials who prosecute them. Such measures are likely to
be most effective when both the enforcer and the person against whom
they are enforced believe that compliance will not constitute an un-
reasonable burden. Some form of economic assistance or relief to
industries making investments in pollution control would probably
boost the efficiency of water quality enforcement very substantially.
The difficulty with government supplied assistance and incentives
for investments in pollution control measures is that in gross they are
wasteful and inequitable. Already, the federal construction grant
program to municipalities discriminates in favor of industries located
within easy access of a city sewer line. Increased tax relief measures
favor dilatory firms over those which have already committed them-
selves to responsible pollution control. Tax incentives are frequently
the least relief to the type of business most in need of assistance in
mounting a pollution control program. Tax relief may in certain cases
tend to subsidize inefficient waste treatment processes and discourage
exploration for more efficient production changes or waste recovery
methods. For these reasons, some form of limited government program
that strategically provides assistance to dollar-short industrial polluters
seems preferable to a broad-gauge incentives program. For industries
that can fairly afford the necessary investments, it is suggested that
they pay their own way in pollution control just as they do with other
legitimate costs of production.
610
INDUSTRIAL WATER POLLUTION
An effluent charge system based on a river basin framework has
much to commend it as a mechanism for generating funds for invest-
ment in pollution control works. Not the least of its advantages is the
equity inherent in charging each waste discharger on the basis of his
individual contribution to the region's water quality problem. The
built-in incentives to each assessed firm to cut costs through improve-
ment of waste management procedures is also an extremely attractive
feature. Difficulties in establishing the charge at an appropriate level
are probably not as severe as claimed by foes of the system.
The current lack of agencies efficiently organized to carry on a
water quality management program on a problemshed basis is by far
the biggest obstacle faced today in achieving the nation's water quality
goals. Although the tradition of local regulation seems well founded
in administrative practicality, the current practice of organizing the
local control effort on the basis of political boundaries rather than on
hydrological problem contours is unsound. Water responds to gravity,
not to politics. Water quality management programs should be organ-
ized functionally on the basis of natural drainage basins, not on the
arbitrary configurations of cities, counties and states. Unless local
interests, both government and industry, assert the necessary leader-
ship to create rational organizations to plan and operate regional water
quality management programs, public pressure for results in water
quality improvement will almost certainly cause the federal govern-
ment to introduce its own brand of river basin management activity.
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